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Health insurers are generally guided by the principle of "actuarial fairness,"
according to which they distinguish among various risks on the basis of cost-
related factors. Thus, insurers often limit or deny coverage for vision care,
hearing aids, mental health care, and even AIDS treatment based on actuarial
justifications. Furthermore, approximately forty-two million Americans have
no health insurance at all, because most of these individuals cannot afford the
cost of insurance. This Article argues that Americans have come to demand
more than actuarial fairness from health insurers and are increasingly
concerned about what I call "moral fairness." This is evidenced by the
hundreds of laws that have been passed to constrain insurers' discretion with
respect to particular coverage decisions. Legislative mandates are frequent, but
seemingly haphazard, following no systematic methodology. This Article
suggests an analytical framework that can be utilized to determine which
interventions are appropriate and evaluates a variety of means by which moral
fairness could be promoted in the arena of health care coverage.
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, health insurers have enjoyed the freedom to determine their own
terms of coverage, to decide to what extent, if any, patients should be reimbursed
for different kinds of treatment, and to establish premium prices. Health insurers
typically deny coverage for speech therapy, eye glasses, hearing aids, most foot
care, and treatment for infertility.' Many insurance providers also exclude or
severely limit coverage for therapy to treat mental illness, dental problems,2 AIDS,
diabetes mellitus, severe obesity, epilepsy, and alcoholism or drug abuse.
3
Insurance restrictions have generated significant litigation, but have rarely been
proscribed by the courts.4 For example, Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company
1. 3 BERTRAM HARNETr & IRVING I. LESNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE
§ 6A. 11[1] (2000).
2. Samuel A. Marcosson, Who Is "Us" and Who Is "Them "-Common Threads and the
Discriminatory Cut-off of Health Care Benefits for AIDS Under ERISA and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 361, 416 (1994).
3. Donald W. Light, The Practice and Ethics of Risk-Rated Health Insurance, 267 JAMA
2503, 2504 (1992).
4. See, e.g., McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179, 186-89 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that
health insurance plan caps for AIDS treatment do not violate the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA")); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608-14 (3rd Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (finding that a disparity in an employer's insurance benefits
for treatment of mental and physical conditions did not violate the ADA); Bythway v.
Principal Health Care of Delaware, Inc., 1999 WL 33220042 (D. Del. 1999) (holding that a
health insurance provision that denied coverage of bone marrow transplants to Hodgkin's
disease patients while allowing it for those suffering from aplastic anemia or acute leukemia
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offered its customers insurance policies that limited lifetime benefits for AIDS or
AIDS-related conditions ("ARC") to either $25,000 or $100,000, while therapy for
other conditions was covered up to $1 million over a lifetime. 5 When this
discrepancy was challenged by two plaintiffs who alleged that it violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),6 the Seventh Circuit ruled that the AIDS
cap was not unlawful and could continue to be utilized by Mutual of Omaha. 7 Thus,
while some Americans enjoy full coverage for all their health needs, other insured
individuals with serious or even life-threatening conditions, such as AIDS, must
incur the expense of costly treatment or forego it if it is unaffordable.
Of even greater concern is the fact that in the United States approximately 42.6
million people have no health insurance coverage whatsoever.8 While the large
population of the American uninsured has generated much debate and
consternation during the past decade,9 little has been done to make health insurance
accessible to those who do not have it.'0 The American health insurance system can
therefore be characterized as having two different gaps: first, discriminatory
insurance terms that adversely affect insureds with particular medical conditions,
and second, the complete exclusion of millions of Americans from the system so
that they have no coverage at all.
An accepted principle that guides health insurers is "actuarial fairness."'' Health
insurers distinguish among various risks on the basis of relevant cost-related factors
and base their insurance terms on expected cost differences.' 2 Insurance markets
drive health insurers to make classifications of health risks based on the costs of
those risks.' 3 These classifications are subject to a rule of nondiscrimination, but
was not unlawfully discriminatory under.the ADA); but see Boots v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 77 F.Supp.2d 211, 215-20 (D.N.H. 1999) (holding that a disability plan's
limitations on coverage for mental disabilities were potentially discriminatory under the
ADA).
5. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 558 (7th Cir. 1999).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
7. Doe, 179 F.3d at 561.
8. Geri Aston, Individual Market Tough for Many Insurance Buyers, AM. MED. NEWS,
July 9-16, 2001, at 14; Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank C. Ullman, Health Insurance and
Health Access, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 247, 247 (2001). Other estimates range from 42.1 million
uninsured (in 1999) to 44 million uninsured (in 2000). See Steven A. Schroeder, Prospects
for Expanding Health Insurance Coverage, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 847, 847 (2001) and
Stephen Blakely, The Economic Costs of the Uninsured, EBRI NoTES, Aug. 2000, at 1. Over
eighty percent of the uninsured are from families in which at least one member is employed,
and almost two-thirds are under the age of thirty-five. Schroeder, supra, at 847. More than
half are in families whose incomes fall below 200% of the federal poverty level, that is, less
than $34,100 for a family of four. Id.
9. See e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care? The Effect of the
Health Care System on the Health of America, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 17-26 (1994).
10. See Laurie Zoloth, Heroic Measures: Just Bioethics in an Unjust World, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 34, 36.
11. See Thomas Murray & Ray Moseley, Panel on Ethical Issues in Genetic Testing, 25
J. INS. MED. 252, 254 (1993) ("One approach that the insurance industry has taken has been
to stress, through some spokespeople, a particular kind of justice, called actuarial fairness.").
12. Comm. on Risk Classification Am. Acad. of Actuaries, Risk Classification Statement
of Principles, 6 J. AM. ACAD. ACTUARIES 132, 133 (1980).
13. Id.
20031
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that rule only prohibits discrimination between people who are in the same
actuarially or economically defined class. Classifications that are actuarially
justified, but that result in discrimination against people who have conditions for
which treatment is not covered or who cannot afford to pay for insurance, are
permissible.
14
Actuarial fairness provides a limited amount of protection to consumers because
it prohibits insurers from implementing exclusions and limitations that are arbitrary
or based purely on prejudice. The American people, however, have come to
demand more than actuarial fairness from the health insurance system. This is
evidenced by the numerous federal and state laws that govern the insurance
industry. Society often chooses to override decisions based purely on actuarial
fairness and instead to impose on insurers standards of what can be described as
"moral fairness," that is, standards that take into account values of just distribution
that cannot be achieved by actuarial fairness alone.15 "Moral fairness" is a complex
concept that evades simple definition. Its meaning will be explored at length
below. 16
In the context of health care coverage, just distribution implicates not only the
avoidance of unfair discrimination in insurance terms for those who are already
beneficiaries of the system, but also a reallocation of resources so that the system
does not exclude a large segment of society. A variety of polls and surveys reveal
that a majority of the American population believes that all Americans should have
a right to adequate health care, 17 though only approximately half state that they are
14. Phillip E. Stano, Underwriting in the Twentieth Century: Grafting Societal Values to
the Regulation of Risk, 19 J. INS. REG. 273, 275-76 (2000).
15. NORMAN DANIELS, SEEKING FAIR TREATMENT: FROM THE AIDS EPIDEMIC TO
NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM 84 (1995); Gostin, supra note 9, at 26-29.
16. See discussion infra Parts III and IV.
17. See e.g., Robert J. Blendon & Karen Donelan, Public Opinion and Efforts to Reform
the U.S. Health Care System: Confronting Issues of Cost-Containment and Access to Care,
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv., Fall 1991, at 146, 147, 151 (stating that as early as 1-942, three-
fourths of Americans stated that the government should provide medical care to all who need
it, and have voiced similar opinions in public opinion surveys that have been conducted
throughout the following decades. Americans, however, have not supported universal health
care as enthusiastically as their counterparts in other countries); Liz Kowalczyk & Raja
Mishra, Ad Blitz Targets Health Care Initiative, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2000, at B1
(discussing a survey that indicated that 72% of Massachusetts voters supported an initiative
that would guarantee universal health care coverage for all state residents); Barbara Langner,
Kansas Commission on the Future of Health Care, Inc.: Working to Define and Solve Health
Care Problems in the State of Kansas, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Fall 1993, at 51, 52
(reporting that over two-thirds of those responding to a survey conducted in Kansas stated
that Americans should have a right to effective health care); Vicente Navarro, Where Is the
Popular Mandate? 307 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1516-18 (1982) (stating that opinion polls in the
U.S. show strong public support for national health insurance even at the cost of higher
taxes).
According to the Roper Center of the University of Connecticut, polls conducted in the
early 1990s by the Los Angeles Times and the Associated Press revealed that approximately
60% of Americans believed "good health care is something all Americans are entitled to
receive from the government." Polls conducted in 1994 by the Princeton Survey Research
Associates ("PSRA")/Newsweek, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, and ABC
News revealed that approximately 70% of Americans supported universal healthcare. Two
[Vol. 78:659
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willing to pay more out-of-pocket for medical services in order to support universal
coverage, when asked specifically about cost implications. 18 Although the
problems of discriminatory insurance terms and the uninsured constitute two
distinct issues, they are both discussed in this paper because both involve an unfair
distribution of resources, and each must be addressed in order to remedy the moral
shortcomings of contemporary health care policy.
A myriad of legislative mandates indicate that Americans are increasingly
choosing to constrain the discretion of health insurers. For example, these statutes
prohibit insurers from rejecting clients in particular circumstances, limit insurers'
ability to determine their benefit terms, and deem many discriminatory
reimbursement restrictions to be unacceptable regardless of their grounding in
sound actuarial analysis. 19 Approximately 1000 different state mandates concerning
health insurance coverage have been issued by state legislatures.20 Over half the
states, for example, have enacted laws prohibiting health insurers from requiring
genetic testing as a condition of coverage or from denying insurance or charging
higher rates based upon the results of genetic tests.21 On the federal level, several
laws establish specific coverage mandates, prohibit various forms of
discrimination, and intervene in the health insurance market in other ways. The
Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998,22 for example, requires all group
health plans and health insurance issuers offering coverage for mastectomies to
provide reimbursement for reconstructive surgery that is associated with a
mastectomy, 23 and is a striking example of a law that prevents insurers from
making their own decisions based on actuarial data.
As this Article shows, government interventions to regulate or change actuarial
classifications are frequent, but seemingly haphazard. They follow no known
years later, in 1996, when the Clinton reforms were no longer a current topic of debate, a
Kaiser/Harvard Health Policy Survey found that individuals responded as follows to the
question of how they felt about universal health care: 18% very positive, 24% somewhat
positive, 19% neutral, 14% somewhat negative, 7% very negative, and 16% unfamiliar with
the concept. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, Public
Opinion Data Search Prepared for Sharona Hoffman (January 2002 on file with author).
18. When individuals were asked by PSRA/Newsweek whether they would be willing to
pay more for routine health care costs in order to allow for universal coverage, only 51%
stated that they would be willing to do so. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, supra
note 17.
19. See discussion of legislation infra Part II.
20. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HEHS 96-161, HEALTH
INSURANCE REGULATION: VARYING STATE REQUIREMENTS AFFECT COST OF INSURANCE 9
(1996) (noting that "[oin average, states have enacted laws mandating about 18 specific
benefits"); Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws:
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2
(1999) (citing Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Markets and Collective Action in
Regulating Managed Care, HEALTH AFF. Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 26, 30); New Study Shows 992
Mandated Benefits in the States, MED. BENEFITS, Sept. 30, 1991, at 6.
21. Mark A. Rothstein & Sharona Hoffman, Genetic Testing, Genetic Medicine, and
Managed Care, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849, 867 (1999).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1185b (Supp. 2000). The Act was passed by Congress as an amendment
to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)
("ERISA").
23. Id.
2003]
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analytical method for determining how to construct socially responsible insurance
categorizations. Indeed, many interventions may be political; they may be a
response to lobbying by discrete groups that have legislative influence. Thus, while
legislative mandates reflect the legislators' sympathy and their desire to provide
morally appropriate remedies for those in need, the laws that are passed may favor
those with a strong political voice without promoting overall moral fairness.
In this Article, I suggest an analytical framework that can be utilized to
determine which interventions are suitable for the health insurance arena. This
typology is not intended to determine the outcome of particular coverage issues or
controversies. Rather, it is intended to suggest considerations that appropriate
social policy ought to take into account in facing specific coverage decisions and in
constructing its health care system.
To build this framework, I develop six principles that should guide
policymakers. Substantively, I make three recommendations: (1) the health care
system should embrace the concept of universality; (2) priority should be given .to
standard therapies that are medically necessary to cure or alleviate the symptoms of
mental or physical impairments that substantially limit major life activities; (3)
priority should be given to standard preventive care. Procedurally, I recommend
that policymakers craft a system that gives stakeholders in the health care system
an opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process. Finally, I address
approaches that policymakers should not utilize. Namely, an absolute
antidiscrimination mandate should not be adopted, and the moral culpability of
patients should not be considered for purposes of coverage decisions.
-Part I of the Article analyzes the structure and values of health insurance in the
United States. Part II discusses existing federal and state legislation that addresses
issues of just distribution in health insurance. Part III explores the nature of moral
fairness, evaluating a large body of scholarship concerning the concept. Part IV
develops original principles of moral fairness to provide guidance for those making
health coverage decisions. Finally, Part V assesses a variety of alternatives for the.
implementation of these principles and the enhancement of moral fairness in health
insurance. These options include: (1) the passage of additional legislation; (2)
deregulation of the health insurance market; (3) the establishment of a new
regulatory governmental agency; and (4) the implementation of a universal
coverage mandate. The advantages and disadvantages of each are carefully
assessed, as is their consistency with the suggested principles.24 The analysis leads
24. This Article focuses only on health insurance and not on other types of insurance,
such as life or casualty insurance. Several distinctions can be made between health insurance
and other insurance benefits. First, health insurance is generally considered to be a necessity
or even a right, while life insurance is generally viewed as far less essential. Mark A.
Rothstein, The Use of Genetic Information for Nonmedical Purposes, 9 J. L. & HEALTH 109,
114 (1994-95); Dennis S. Karjala, A Legal Research Agenda for the Human Genome
Initiative, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 121, 173-74 (1991); Roberta B. Meyer, Justification for
Permitting Life Insurers to Continue to Underwrite on the Basis of Genetic Information and
Genetic Test Results, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1271, 1293 (1993); Murray & Moseley, supra
note 11, at 256. Norman Daniels argues that reasonable access to health care is necessary to
promote fair equality of opportunity for all members of society because those who are ill or
disabled often cannot function without medical attention. DANIELS, supra note 15, at 11.
Another scholar asserts that reasonably good health is necessary in order to earn a
livelihood, to exercise the fundamental rights of liberty and autonomy, and to achieve
[Vol. 78:659
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to the conclusion that while the first two alternatives are not advisable, the second
two hold promise as effective mechanisms for the promotion of moral fairness.
I. THE STRUCTURE AND VALUES OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM
A. How the Health Insurance System Works
Health insurers design their plans to manage health risks by distributing them
among a large number of individuals. 25 Individuals pay a relatively small sum for
insurance coverage, the insurance premium, and receive in return a promise from
the insurance company to pay costs for the insured if they suffer illness or injury. 26
The insured avoid the risk of suffering a devastating loss by accepting a limited
expense, that is, the payment of periodic premiums.27 On the other hand, health
insurance providers protect themselves against net losses by covering a large
number of individuals. 28 Some of the insured will suffer costly health problems and
will require the insurer to pay more in expenses than it earned from their premium
paynents, but others will be healthy and will require little or no reimbursement
from the insurer, thus allowing it to profit from their premium payments. 29
Consequently, healthy people subsidize treatment of the sick, because their
premium payments are used to cover costs for those who need frequent or
expensive care.
In order to safeguard the company's economic viability, health insurers also
utilize a mechanism known as "risk classification." Risk classification can be
defined as "[c]ategorization on the basis of established criteria for rating risks,
establishing premiums and tabulating statistical experience." 3' Risk classification
typically has three basic components: rating, coverage, and underwriting. 32 Rating
is the practice of assigning different premiums to individuals or groups in different
personal satisfaction, happiness, and fulfilling personal relationships. Gostin, supra note 9, at
12-13. Therefore, health insurance serves the important social function of providing people
with access to health care so that they can have a fair opportunity to enjoy and succeed in
life. Thomas H. Murray, Genetics and the Moral Mission of Health Insurance, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 12, 16; Murray & Moseley, supra note 11, at 254 ("[lUn
some ways . . . reasonably good health is the precondition for the pursuit of all the other
things that are good in life."). Life and property insurance do not provide benefits that are of
the same magnitude. Furthermore, life insurance and property insurance are utilized in
response to isolated, catastrophic events. By contrast, people seek health care throughout
their lives for a variety of purposes, including maintaining good health, preventing illness,
and treating existing ailments. Id. at 255. Health insurance, therefore, has a much more
important presence in people's lives than other types of insurance.
25. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 1 (1986).
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. See Maria O'Brien Hylton, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Deregulation of
Insurance to Advantage the Working Poor, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 687, 691 (1997).
31. RICHARD V. Rupp, Rupp's INSURANCE & RISK MANAGEMENT GLOSSARY 76 (1991).
32. Hylton, supra note 30, at 691.
2003]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
risk categories based on general criteria. 33 The term "coverage" refers to the
insurer's ability to reduce the amount of coverage offered or the number of events
covered for its insured. 34 Underwriting relates to an insurer's specific decision
concerning whether, and on what basis, to accept a particular customer. 35
Health insurance is sold on both an individual and a group basis. 36 In some
cases, health insurance policies are sold to individuals, and the insurer may assess
the applicants' health risks on a case-by-case basis. 37 Insurers also sell policies to
groups, such as employee groups for whom employers provide insurance benefits.
Insurers classifying risks for group health insurance will consider the
characteristics of the group as a whole by examining factors such as gender, age,
industry of the group's employer, geographic area of residence, family
composition, and group size.38 Each member of the group pays the same premium,
and low risk members are assumed to subsidize their higher risk counterparts
within the group.
39
Insurers have broad discretion when engaging in risk classification, and they
utilize a variety of tools in making underwriting decisions.40 These tools include
the application form, reports obtained from the individual's treating physician;, and
a medical examination conducted for insurance purposes. 4" Insurance underwriters
also consult the company's underwriting manual, which provides a listing of
various health and social conditions and specifies the effect they should have on
policy issuance. 42 Finally, underwriters can consult the company's medical
director 43 and the Medical Information Bureau ("MIB"), which has a vast data bank
containing medical and social information concerning a large number of
individuals who have previously applied for insurance.
44
In many states, insurance providers are not required to disclose the criteria they
use in making insurance decisions, and state governments often do not analyze the
33 . Id. An insurer, for example, might charge smokers a higher premium than
nonsmokers.
34. Id. An insurer might decide to exclude coverage for vision care, dental care, or
mental health care.
35. Id. See also Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. luculano, AIDS and Insurance: The
Rationale for AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1806, 1809 (1987); Stano, supra
note 14, at 275; Rupp, supra note 31, at 335.
36. See Clifford & Iuculano, supra note 35, at 1809.
37. See id.
38. Id.; John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 374
(1997); Marcosson, supra note 2, at 411.
39. See BANKS McDOWELL, THE CRISIS IN INSURANCE REGULATION 96-97 (1994).
40. See HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 1, § 3.01[2].
41. Id.
42. Id. § 3.01[2][c].
43. This is a physician who is employed by the insurance company. Id. § 3.01[2][f].
44. Id. § 3.01[2][d]. The MIB was established in 1909 as an association of medical
directors of several large insurers who wished to pool data about people who applied to their
companies for insurance. MIB members can access the data bank's information by
submitting the name and birth date of the proposed insured and can add to the data bank any
information they have learned concerning the health problems and risks of their applicants.
[Vol. 78:659
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statistical information upon which insurers base their classifications.45 Furthermore,
state statutes provide only vague guidelines, requiring that classifiers "reasonably
reflect differences in loss experience and that the data be credible.
4 6
According to some analysts, the regulatory vacuum has led to significant flaws
in contemporary risk classification practices. Classification decisions often are not
actuarially sound, and different insurers vary significantly in how much risk they
assign to identical disorders.47 As one commentator notes, insurers "are free to
45. Sheri A. Mullikin, Note, A Cost Analysis Approach to Determining the
Reasonableness of Using Domestic Violence as an Insurance Classification, 25 J. LEGIS.
195, 198 (1999); Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be Left to the
Actuaries, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349, 373 (1986). However, insurers may be required to
file records reflecting their classification of risks, premium rates, and policy forms with their
state's insurance commissioner's office. See LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON
INSURANCE 3d § 2:24 (1997). The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
("NAIC") suggests that states include the following language in their "Guidelines for Filing
of Rates for Individual Health Insurance Forms": "[e]ach rate submission shall include an
actuarial memorandum describing the basis on which rates were determined and shall
indicate and describe the calculation of the ratio, hereinafter called 'anticipated loss ratio,' of
the present value of the expected benefits to the present value of the expected premiums over
the entire period for which rates are computed to provide coverage." NAIC MODEL LAWS,
REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 134-1 (1989). The states vary widely with respect to their
requirements. Maryland, for example, provides that "[a]t the request of the Commissioner,
each insurer shall file with the Commissioner a copy of its underwriting standards" and that
"[tihe Commissioner may review and examine the underwriting standards to ensure
compliance with [the law]." MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-501(h)(2), (3) (2002). North Dakota
requires small employer carriers to file only their actual benefit plans with the insurance
commissioner. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-36.3-06 (2002). Other states require insurers to
maintain, at their principal places of business, descriptions of their rating practices and proof
that their rating methods are based on sound actuarial principles and to file with the
commissioner an annual certification affirming the actuarial soundness of their plans. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 10-16-105(6) (1999); FLA. STAT. ch. 627.6699(8) (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §
31A-30-106(4) (2001).
46. Wortham, supra note 45, at 372. Common statutory language pertaining to insurance
rate standards prohibits rates from being "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory."
See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.39.030(a)(1) (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-356(1)
(West 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-67-208(a) (Michie 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §
2503(a)(2) (1999); FLA. STAT. ch. § 627.062(1) (1996 & Supp. 2002); GA. CODE ANN. §
33-9-4(1) (1996 & Supp. 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-4-1-4(7)(C)(iii) (West 1993 & Supp.
2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 379.318(4) (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-16-201(1)(a)
(2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-17-6(A) (Michie 1978 & Supp. 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. §
56-5-303(1) (2000 and Supp. 2002); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 625.11(1) (West 1995 and Supp.
2002). Many statutes pertaining to insurance rates allow insurers to "measure any
differences among risks that can be demonstrated to have a probable effect upon losses or
expenses." See ALASKA STAT. § 21.39.030(a)(4) (Michie 2000); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 20-
356(4) (West 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-67-210(a) (Michie 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
18, § 2503(a)(5) (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-9-4(7) (1996 & Supp. 2002); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 379.318(2) (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-16-201(4) (2001).
47. Light, supra note 3, at 2505. See also 28 C.F.R. App. B § 36.212 (2001) (noting that
"[sleveral commenters reported that, even when statistics are available, they are often
outdated and do not reflect current medical technology and treatment methods" and that
according to one insurer, "hard data and actuarial statistics are not available to provide
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choose among the infinite number of marginally valid relationships between
applicants' circumstances and possible health risks, choosing, combining, and
rejecting them with or without plan or rationale. 48 While some errors that are
made in the marketplace can be benign and affect only the competitive advantage
of the seller, mistakes in risk classification might be of much greater concern
because they can result in denial of coverage for life-saving therapy such as AIDS
treatment.
The health insurance industry is characterized by a number of market failures,
49
one of which is inconsistent risk classification methodology. 50 Other market
imperfections include information imbalance and disparity of bargaining power
between insurers and consumers, as well as externalities that are imposed on third
parties. 51 These market failures will be discussed at length below, 52 as they explain
why government intervention in the health insurance industry is justifiable and why
so many attempts have been made to change market outcomes through regulation.
At this point, however, it is useful to explore the general values that underlie the
industry.
B. The Recognized Values of the Health Insurance System
The health insurance system in the United States embodies competing goals and
therefore is characterized by a number of tensions. The contrasting objectives of
the health insurance system are: efficiency, social pooling, individual advantage,
actuarially justified discrimination, and fairness.
precise numerical justifications for every underwriting determination.")
48. Jacobi, supra note 38, at 329.
49. A market failure can be defined as occurring in the absence of one or more of the
conditions for perfect competition. According to one source, there are five basic conditions
for perfect competition:
(i) there are a huge number of buyers and sellers; (ii) the products traded in the
market are homogenous; (iii) each market participant has perfect knowledge of
the offers made by each side; (iv) there are no barriers to entry into or exit out
of a market; and (v) transaction costs are zero.
Mathias Strasser, A New Paradigm in Intellectual Property Law? The Case Against Open
Sources, 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 97 n.288 (2001). Another source asserts that there are
four conditions for perfect competition: "product homogeneity, relatively small buyers and
sellers, mobile resources, and perfect information." Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice As
the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 503, 505 n.9 (2001) (citing EDWIN
MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMics: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 232-33 (5th ed. 1985)). An
alternative definition of market failure is the following: "'market failure' means that unless
something is done to fix things, people will produce either too much or too little of some
good or service, where 'too much or too little' are defined in relation to what would be the
optimal use of society's resources." I. Trotter Hardy, Not So Different: Tangible, Intangible,
Digital, and Analog Works and Their Comparison for Copyright Purposes, 26 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 211, 218 (2001).
50. Jacobi, supra note 38, at 329.
51. ABRAHAM, supra note 25, at 32-33; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES AND
NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN STATE REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS 10-13 (1979)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
52. See infra Part V.B.
[Vol. 78:659
UNMANAGED CARE: TOWARDS MORAL FAIRNESS
1. Efficiency
Inherent in the competitive insurance market is the value of efficiency. 53
Insurers seek to compete for customers with low health risks by setting prices that
reflect expected loss and thus are attractive to individuals or groups with good
health.54 Similarly, insureds may want choices so that they can shop for the policies
that are most attractive to them.
5
Health insurers are particularly concerned about two phenomena identified by
economic theory: adverse selection and moral hazard. "Adverse selection" refers to
a potential shift in the health insurance customer population. If insurers raise
premium prices too high, those who perceive themselves as being low-risk will
consider the product's price to be higher than its value and will therefore buy little,
if any, health insurance coverage.5 6 Those who believe they are high-risk will
purchase extensive coverage, unless premium prices rise to the point that it is
cheaper for consumers to pay for the full cost of health care out-of-pocket.57 If all
individuals who have insurance coverage incur high medical costs because of
health problems, insurance prices will rise higher and higher, creating a "death
spiral" of premiums and leading ever-decreasing numbers of healthy people to buy
insurance. As prices continue to rise, even high-risk individuals will become unable
to afford insurance coverage. Ultimately, adverse selection could destabilize or
even bankrupt the insurance industry. 58 Insurers therefore try to keep premium
prices low by attracting as many low risk insureds as possible.
The term "moral hazard" refers to the concern that the acquisition of insurance
itself leads to a change in individuals' behavior.5 9 Those who have health insurance
are more likely to use medical facilities than those who are uninsured, because their
use of medical services is subsidized. 6° Thus, health insurance can increase the cost
of health care through unnecessary doctor visits. 61 In addition, insured individuals
53. See ABRAHAM, supra note 25, at 10-11.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Jacobi, supra note 38, at 387.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 387-388; Mark A. Hall, Insurers' Use of Genetic Information, 37 JURIMETRICS
J. 13, 17-18 (1996).
59. Kenneth Vogel, Discrimination on the Basis of HIV Infection: An Economic Analysis,
49 OHIO ST. L.J. 965, 990 (1989). Moral hazard can be defined more specifically as follows:
A moral hazard problem is encountered when payment of medical expenses is
borne by a third party, either an insurance company or the government,
affecting the individual's own behaviour. It may lead the individual to
overconsume medical services and his doctor to overtreat. It has nothing to do
with morality but represents a misallocation of resources by a particular method
of finance. Since the third party, be it the government or the insurance company
pays the full cost, the individual bears no financial burden or faces a zero price
for medical care.
Michael D. Barr, Medical Savings Accounts in Singapore: A Critical Inquiry, 26 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 709, 716 (2001) (quoting TOH MUN HENG & LINDA Low, HEALTH CARE
ECONOMICS, POLICIES, AND ISSUES IN SINGAPORE 9 (1991)).
60. Vogel, supra note 59, at 990.
61. See id. at 991.
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might be more careless about their health and will take imprudent risks because
62they know that they can receive high quality care in case of illness or injury. In
order to address concerns of moral hazard, insurers exclude coverage for treatments
that are not "medically necessary" and lower individual policy premium rates for
people who live healthy lifestyles, thus creating incentive to refrain from risky
behavior, such as smoking.63
2. Social Pooling vs. Individual Advantage
The availability of health insurance enables each person to diminish his or her
own risk of devastating medical expenses. This system of "social pooling" fosters
an environment of mutual aid and social responsibility.64 All purchasers of
insurance pay premiums whether or not they will incur any health care costs during
the relevant period, and as a consequence of insurance coverage, theoretically no
insured should suffer a catastrophic loss.
6 5
In truth, however, consumers do not purchase insurance for altruistic reasons or
out of a sense of social responsibility. Rather, they try to obtain maximum
protection for the cheapest rate, to their own advantage. The more insurers make
distinctions based on rating, coverage, and underwriting, the more they undermine
the goal of social pooling and promote risk segmentation and individual
advantage.66 This is exacerbated by the competitive private insurance market in
which insurers vie with each other to attract low risk clients by offering them
appealing coverage packages. The health insurance system thus embodies a tension
between social pooling and individual advantage.
3. Fair and Unfair Discrimination: The Concept of Actuarial Fairness
The private insurance system is by nature discriminatory.67 Individuals or groups
that represent a higher risk routinely pay higher premium costs. 6 8 Discrimination,
in fact, may be perceived as part of an insurer's responsibility. Commentators have
stated that "[a]n insurance company has the responsibility to treat all its
policyholders fairly by establishing premiums at a level consistent with the risk
represented by each individual policyholder." 69 Thus, insurers engage in a process
of risk segmentation, assigning different costs to high-risk and low-risk insureds.
70
While discrimination is inherent in the insurance system, not all forms of
62. See id. at 990.
63. See id. at 991.
64. See Jacobi, supra note 38, at 312.
65. Individuals remain vulnerable to financial catastrophe, however, if coverage for their
loss is excluded or limited by the policy terms.
66. See Jacobi, supra note 38, at 312, 367.
67. Stano, supra note 14, at 275.
68. Id.
69. Clifford & luculano, supra note 35, at 1808. See also Herman T. Bailey et al., The
Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classification, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 779, 780 (1976)
("[b]asic to the concept of providing insurance to persons of different ages, sexes, ...
occupations and health histories ... [is] the right of the insurer to create classifications to
recognize the many differences which exist among individuals").
70. See Jacobi, supra note 38, at 364.
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discrimination are considered acceptable. The insurance literature is fraught with
references to "unfair discrimination," a practice that is rejected, at least in
principle. 71 The Unfair Trade Practices Act ("UTPA"), which was developed by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") and was adopted in
some form by all fifty states,72 defines "unfair discrimination" as follows:
Making or permitting any unfair discrimination between individuals of the
same class and of essentially the same hazard in the amount of premium, policy
fees or rates charged for any accident or health insurance policy or in the
benefits payable thereunder, or in any of the terms or conditions of such policy,
or in any other manner.73
In other words, unfair discrimination occurs when there is no valid actuarial or
medical justification for risk classification, and thus, equal risks are treated
differently and unequal risks are treated the same.74 As one commentator stated,
"[t]he recognized goal of risk classification is not equality of treatment of insureds,
but their equitable assignment to the risk category each represents. 75
In a document entitled Risk Classification Statement of Principles, the American
Academy of Actuaries ("The Academy") stated that the risk classification process
should serve three primary goals: protection of the insurance system's financial
soundness, fairness, and promotion of economic incentives that will encourage
broad availability of coverage.76 The Academy listed the following principles as
essential to the achievement of these objectives:
The system should reflect expected cost differences [in coverage for
different individuals].
The system should distinguish among risks on the basis of relevant
cost-related factors.
The system should be applied objectively.
The system should be practical and cost-effective.
The system should be acceptable to the public.77
"Fair discrimination" in the insurance realm is widely perceived as dependent
upon actuarial fairness. So long as the insurance system reflects expected cost
differences among individuals, distinguishes among risks based on economic
71. Stano, supra note 14, at 275.
72. Clifford and luculano, supra note 35, at 1809-10.
73. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 880-4 (1998). The Act also
prohibits "[r]efusing to insure, refusing to continue to insure, or limiting the amount of
coverage available to an individual because of the sex, marital status, race, religion or
national origin of the individual." Id. It does not, however, address the permissibility of rate
differentiation based on gender, marital status, race, religion, or national origin.
74. Clifford and luculano, supra note 35, at 1809-10; Am. Acad. of Actuaries Comm. on
Risk Classification, supra note 12, at 140.
75. Stano, supra note 14, at 276.
76. Comm. on Risk Classification Am. Acad. of Actuaries, supra note 12, at 133.
77. Id. at 133-34.
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factors, and treats equal risks equally, it is considered "fair.' Actuarial fairness
provides some protection to consumers because it prohibits insurers from
implementing exclusions and limitations that are arbitrary or based purely on
prejudice. The protection, however, is limited, because once insurers can justify
their discriminatory terms by citing an economic reason for them, the doctrine of
actuarial fairness demands nothing further. Actuarial fairness is therefore different
from "fairness" as it is commonly understood in other realms, that is, moral
fairness.
78
C. The Unrecognized Value: Moral Fairness
AIDS caps and exclusions of coverage for mental health care might be
actuarially fair if they can be economically justified by an insurer. However,
insurance terms that preclude coverage of treatment for life-threatening diseases
such as AIDS or severe mental illness are not morally fair. Moral fairness requires
equity and just distribution of societal goods and would forbid abandonment of the
sick and disabled.79
American society has demonstrated a growing concern about moral fairness in
the health care arena. The establishment of Medicaid constitutes a clear expression
of the public's willingness to assist the disadvantaged, even at significant taxpayer
expense .80 Another notable example is the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), s' which requires hospitals to screen all patients
who arrive at their emergency departments s2 and to stabilize them if they are found
to be in an emergency condition, regardless of the patients' ability to pay for these
services.83 In addition, we have taken important steps to impose a system of moral
fairness on the insurance industry. Legislatures have passed many statutes that
deem certain types of discrimination to be unacceptable even if they are grounded
in sound actuarial analysis84 Thus, while the prevalent assumption is that insurers
are subjected only to the limitations of actuarial fairness, in truth, they are
increasingly obligated to embrace the value of moral fairness and to offer products
that reflect it.
One might ask why moral fairness is a legitimate consideration in the health
insurance context. Many scholars answer that question by noting that health care is
78. See DANIELS, supra note 15, at 84 ("These are two altogether different notions:
Actuarial fairness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for moral fairness or
justice in an insurance scheme-most especially not in a health insurance scheme.")
79. See id; Gostin, supra note 9, at 26-29. See also Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially
Fair Insurance Pricing Actually Fair?: A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355, 403 (1997) ("IThe debate about whether the actuarial fairness
principle ought to govern health insurance pricing is a debate about whether ours is a
community that is committed to the provision of aid to those who are sick or disabled."). The
concept of moral fairness is analyzed in detail infra Parts III and IV.
80. NORMAN DANIELS ET AL., BENCHMARKS OF FAIRNESS FOR'HEALTH CARE REFORM 17
(1996); Murray, supra note 24, at 16-17.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d (b) (2000).
84. DANIELS, supra note 15, at 90. For a description of these laws, see discussion infra
Part II.
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different from other commodities and services, because one's ability to exercise
any life function is often tied to one's health status. Norman Daniels argues that
reasonable access to health care is necessary to promote fair equality of opportunity
for all members of society to achieve normal functioning. 5 Another scholar asserts
that reasonably good health is necessary in order to earn a livelihood, to exercise
the fundamental rights of liberty and autonomy, and to achieve personal
satisfaction, happiness, and fulfilling personal relationships.8 6 Therefore, health
insurance serves the important social function of providing people with access to
health care so that they can have a fair opportunity to enjoy and succeed in life.8 7
Even the very conservative thinker, Richard Epstein, acknowledges that "the
strongest defender of the market faith has to blanch visibly when the logic of
voluntary exchanges is applied to a newborn infant left malnourished on the
doorstep of a public hospital.8 8
Yet another justification for concern about moral fairness in the health care
arena is presented by Deborah Stone, who critiques managed care. Contemporary
patients have experienced a significant change in the nature of their relationships
with doctors operating within the incentive systems of managed care.89 Doctors
must now consider the financial impact of their clinical decisions upon their own
incomes, and therefore, economic considerations are now central to their clinical
practices. 90 According to Stone, this transformation has led to a situation in which
lives are commodities and patients "enter doctors' offices and other health care
institutions with price tags from payers telling what their life is worth to the
provider."91 Doctors, therefore, may sometimes have incentives to sacrifice patient
welfare for the sake of financial gain. In light of the unique importance of health
services and managed care's influence on medical practice, societal concern about
moral fairness in the health insurance context is both understandable and
justifiable.
85. DANIELS, supra note 15, at 11.
86. Gostin, supra note 9, at 12-13.
87. Murray, supra note 24, at 16; Murray & Moseley, supra note 11, at 254 ("in some
ways... reasonably good health is the precondition for the pursuit of all the other things that
are good in life.").
88. Richard A. Epstein, Rationing Access to Medical Care: Some Sober Second
Thoughts, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV., Fall 1991, at 81, 82. Epstein continues:
Clearly there is no capacity for the archtypical voluntary exchange that drives
the market. Yet deep in our bones we (and it is the primordial, collective "we")
are convinced that the benefits that can be conferred upon the child in distress
far outweigh the costs, necessarily borne by others, that are necessary to
respond to the particular case.
Id.
89. See Deborah A. Stone, Managed Care and the Second Great Transformation, 24 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1213 (1999) [hereinafter Stone, Managed Care]; Deborah A.
Stone, The Doctor as Businessman: The Changing Politics of a Cultural Icon, 22 J. HEALTH
POE. POL'Y & L. 533, 533-34 (1997) [hereinafter Stone, Doctor as Businessman].
90. Stone, Doctor as Businessman, supra note 89, at 533-34.
91. Stone, Managed Care, supra note 89, at i216. Stone states dramatically that managed
care's market paradigm "respects no human bonds, shows no mercy, and has no use for
kindness, loyalty, and other moral qualities of community." Id. at 1217.
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II. LAWS THAT PROMOTE MORAL FAIRNESS IN HEALTH INSURANCE
Numerous federal and state laws promote moral fairness and prohibit particular
types of discrimination in health insurance. None of these laws, however, provides
comprehensive protection to insurance beneficiaries, and most are characterized by
significant gaps and loopholes.92 The laws, therefore, create an extensive but costly
and somewhat chaotic regulatory scheme to govern health insurance coverage
matters.
The federal laws fall into a number of different categories. First, several laws
establish specific coverage mandates. For example, the Mental Health Parity Act
("MHPA"), 93 which was passed in 1996, requires group health plans that provide
both physical and mental health care benefits to apply the same aggregate lifetime
limits to both. However, the law exempts all group plans for which parity would
generate an increase in costs of one percent or more 94 and does not apply to
employers who have fewer than fifty employees. 95
A different law, the Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998,96 requires
all group health plans and health insurance issuers offering coverage for
mastectomies to provide reimbursement for reconstructive surgery that is
associated with a mastectomy. 97 Yet another law creates coverage mandates
relating to childbirth. It prohibits insurers from restricting hospital stays for new
mothers to less than forty-eight hours following natural childbirth and less than
ninety-six hours following a cesarean section.
98
A second category of federal laws does not address specific coverage
requirements, but rather, prohibits discrimination in health insurance in particular
circumstances. One such law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII"), prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals with respect to
benefits of employment because of their "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 99 Title VII includes a 1978 amendment known as the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, which prohibits discrimination based on "pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions" and requires that women affected by
these conditions receive "benefits under fringe benefit programs" that are
92. For a thorough analysis of the statutory gaps left by the federal antidiscrimination
laws, see Sharona Hoffman, AIDS Caps, Contraceptive Coverage, and the Law: An Analysis
of the Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes' Applicability to Health Insurance, 23 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1315 (2002).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (2000).
94. Id. § 300gg-5(c)(2).
95. Id. §§ 300gg-5(c)(1), 300gg-91(e)(4).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 1185b (2000). The Act was passed by Congress as an amendment to
ERISA.
97. Id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a) (2000). The law was passed as an amendment to the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-300gg-92
(2000).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994). A covered employer is defined as "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). Several exemptions, however, are established in the
provision. Id.
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equivalent to those given to other employees. 100 Title VII, however, applies only to
employment discrimination. 10 1 Thus, employer-provided insurance plans may not
adopt coverage distinctions based on race, national origin, religion, or sex, but
benefits purchased directly from an insurance company are not governed by Title
VII.
1°1
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 103 prohibits
employment discrimination based on age'°4 and protects individuals who are forty
years old or older. 10 5 Nevertheless, the statute does not require that employers offer
older employees health insurance benefits that are equivalent to those available to
younger workers. Rather, it mandates only that employers spend equal amounts of
money or incur equal costs for insurance benefits provided to older and younger
members of the workforce.' °6 Like Title VII, the ADEA governs the conduct of
employers but not of insurers in their nonemployer capacities. Thus, no federal law
prohibits private insurance companies from discriminating against customers on the
basis of age, gender, religion, race, or national origin.
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") is yet another federal
antidiscrimination law, and its effect on insurance benefits has generated a plethora
of litigation and controversy. 107 In general, the ADA prohibits discrimination
against individuals with disabilities because of their disabilities. 108 The
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
102. Id.
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
104. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000). The provision reads in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.
Id.
105. 29 U.S.C. § 63 1(a) (2000).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (2000). The provision reads in relevant part:
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization ....
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan-
(i) where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount of
payment made or cost incurred on behalf of an older worker is no less than
that made or incurred on behalf of a younger worker....
Id.
It should also be noted that under Medicare law, an employer must offer its Medicare-
eligible employees the same health benefits that it offers similarly situated employees under
the age of sixty-five. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 2001). Thus, an employer
may not take the availability of Medicare into account when establishing an employee's
health benefits. See also Erie County Retirees Assoc. v. County of Erie, Pa., 220 F.3d 193,
197-98, 216 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that defendant who offered Medicare-eligible retirees
health insurance benefits that were inferior to those provided to retirees who were not
eligible for Medicare was not entitled to summary judgment unless it could show that it
could meet the equal benefit or equal cost standard).
107. For a detailed analysis of the ADA's applicability to health insurance see Hoffman,
supra note 92.
108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12182(a) (1994).
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antidiscrimination requirement applies both to insurers 109 and to employers who
offer health insurance as a benefit to employees. "0
One would assume that the ADA, addressing disability discrimination by
employers and insurers, would provide extensive protection for health insurance
beneficiaries. This, however, is not the case. First, the ADA applies only to
discrimination that is based on disability, and the courts have generally interpreted
the term "disability" very narrowly."' Furthermore, the ADA does not per se
prohibit utilization of disability-based distinctions such as AIDS caps." 2 Rather, it
allows insurers to retain discriminatory insurance terms so long as they can prove a
109. Title III of the ADA provides that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation .... " See
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). A "place of public accommodation" includes an insurance
office. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994); Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d at 557, 558
(7th Cir. 1999).
110. Title I of the ADA provides that "[nlo covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). The provision has been interpreted to include a prohibition
against discrimination with respect to "[flringe benefits available by virtue of employment,
whether or not administered by the [employer]." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(f) (2000). Employer-
provided health insurance is thus a benefit covered by the statute. EEOC, APPLICATION OF
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITY ACT OF 1990 TO DISABILITY-BASED DISTINCTION IN
EMPLOYER PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE 915.002 (June 8, 1993).
111. See Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams 122 S. Ct. 681, 693
(2002) (holding that in order to have a disability, "an individual must have an impairment
that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central
importance to most people's daily lives"); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
482-83 (1999) (holding that an individual with a physical or mental impairment whose
symptoms are controlled by medication or whose condition is mitigated by the use of
corrective devices does not have a disability and is not entitled to ADA protection);
Hoffman, supra note 92, at 1322.
112. The ADA contains text that specifically addresses the extent to .which the statute
governs insurance and significantly limits the scope of its antidiscrimination mandate. The
provision, known as section 501(c) of the Act, states the following:
[T]his Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict-
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance
organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar
organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such
risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing,
sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan
that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such
risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing,
sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan
that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of [the Act].
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1995).
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basis for them in sound actuarial principles, past cost experience, or evidence
regarding reasonably anticipated benefit claims. 113 In truth, therefore, the ADA
embraces the concept of actuarial fairness and does not go beyond it to require
moral fairness in cases where the insurer's benefits limitation or exclusion is
actuarially justified." 4
A third kind of federal law, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act ("HIPAA"),l 15 is exclusively devoted to health insurance issues, attempting to
resolve some of the most difficult problems faced by insureds and to provide them
with extensive protection. HIPAA requires that all group health plans limit to no.
more than twelve months their period of excluded coverage for preexisting
conditions; that is, conditions for which medical advice, diagnosis, care, or
treatment was recommended or received in the prior six months. 116 HIPAA's
portability provisions guarantee that individuals covered by group insurance at one
employer for eighteen continuous months will be granted access to any group
policy offered by a new employer."1
7
HIPAA furthermore requires insurers operating in the small-group market" 8 to
guarantee issue of all the products they offer in the small-group market to all small
groups. In any group, all eligible members of the group must be offered enrollment,
regardless of their health status." 9 In addition, a group health plan may not require
any member of a group to pay a higher premium than other members of the group
113. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136-37.
114. The legislative history of the ADA reveals that § 501(c), discussed supra note 112,
was included because of a concern that without it, the ADA could destabilize the insurance
industry. It is therefore "intended to afford to insurers and employers the same opportunities
they would enjoy in the absence of the [ADA] to design and administer insurance products
and benefit plans in a manner that is consistent with basic principles of insurance risk
classification." S. REP. 101-116, at 136-37 (1989). Thus, the provision was designed, at least
partly, to appease the insurance lobby and assure the insurance industry that established state
regulation in the insurance field and traditional risk classification practices need not be
modified in light of the ADA. David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, HIV Infection and
the Americans with Disabilities Act: An Evolving Interaction, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 84, 91 (1997).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-300gg-92 (1996 and Supp. 2001).
116. Id. § 300gg(a). In the case of a late enrollee, the period of excluded coverage may be
extended to eighteen months. Id. In addition, group insurers must generally credit enrollees
for any time during which they were previously excluded from coverage because of a
preexisting condition exclusion that was applied to them while they were covered by a
different insurer. Id.§§ 300gg(a), (c).
117. Id.. § 300gg- 11. This portability requirement is designed to alleviate the concerns of
employees who were reluctant to leave current jobs for fear that they will be denied health
insurance by future employers because of preexisting conditions. Len M. Nichols & Linda J.
Blumberg, A Different Kind of 'New Federalism'? The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, HEALTH AFFAIRS, May/June 1998, at 25, 32.
118. A small group is defined as consisting of two to fifty members. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-
91(e)(4), (5) (1996 and Supp. 2001).
119. Id.. § 300gg-1 1. More specifically, HIPAA provides that insurers offering group
insurance may not base rules of eligibility for enrollment on any of the following factors:
health status, physical or mental illness, claims experience, receipt of health care, medical-
history, genetic information, evidence of insurability, or disability. Id.. §§ 300gg-l(a)-(h).
2003]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
because of a health-status related factor.120 The statute requires all group carriers, in
both large and small group markets, to guarantee renewal of their products.'
21
HIPAA also reaches individual health insurance policies. It guarantees the
portability of group insurance to individual insurance for certain individuals 122 and
requires that all individual policy coverage be guaranteed renewable.' 23 The statute
does not, however, restrict the amount of premium. that an insurer may charge a
person purchasing an individual policy. 124 It also does not address limitations and
exclusions of coverage for particular treatments.
The state laws that govern health insurance coverage are numerous and varied.
The laws focus on coverage issues relating to AIDS/HIV treatment; bone marrow
transplants; prescription contraceptives; prosthetic devices; drug and alcohol
rehabilitation services; mental health care; fertility treatments; hospice care; dental,
vision, and hearing care; speech therapy; and other medical services.' 25 Over half
120. Id. § 300gg-l(b). Different groups, however, can be charged different premiums,
based on the insurers' assessment of the risk status of all members of the group. Id.
121. Id. § 300gg-12.
122. Id. § 300gg-41. Individuals are eligible under the following conditions: (1) they
have had eighteen months of continuous prior coverage with no coverage gap lasting longer
than sixty-two days and have most recently had group coverage; (2) they have exhausted any
COBRA benefits available to them and have no current access to group insurance or a public
program; and (3) they are eligible for some type of guaranteed issue coverage in the
individual market. See Id. § 300gg-41(b).
123. Id. § 300gg-42.
124. Id. § 300gg-41(g)(l). The absence of regulation in this area is significant. A recent
study found a vast range of annual premiums in the individual market extending from $408
to $30,000, with an average of $2998 per year for healthy single people and $3996 for those
with medical problems. Aston, supra note 8, at 14.
125. The following are examples of various state mandates regarding health insurance
coverage. The requirements vary as to their details and applicability to group and/or
individual health insurance policies. They are presented here in terms of general coverage
categories.
AIDS/HIV treatment: D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-1603(b)-(d) (1981-1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 627.429(5)(a) (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.429(5)(b) (West 1996 &
Supp. 2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-013(5)(a) (Banks-Baldwin 2000); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2837-G(2)(A) (West 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 470
(2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.671 (West 1996); TEX. INS. CODE art. 3.51-6 § 3C (West
Supp.2001); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.93 (West 1995).
Bone marrow transplants: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236(2) (West 1996 & Supp. 2001)
(for cancer); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-29-3.3(a) (1996) (for breast cancer and Hodgkin's
disease); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47R (West 1998) (for breast cancer that has
progressed to metastatic disease); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62A.309(Subd. 2) (West 1996) (for
breast cancer); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1200(1) (West Supp. 2001) (for breast cancer); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-c (1998) (for breast cancer); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:26-2.lj
(West 1996) (for cancer); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:26-2.ld (West 1996) (for Wilm's tumor);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2504(a) (2000) (for cancer, in the event that such coverage is
included in the TennCare program); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.1:1(A) (Michie 1999) (for
breast cancer).
FDA-approved contraceptive coverage, generally in plans that cover other prescription
drugs and/or outpatient services: CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(a)(1) (West Supp. 2001);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-503e(a) (West Supp. 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §
3559(a)-(b) (Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-24-59.6(c), (e)(2) (Supp. 2000); HAW. REV.
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STAT. §§ 431:10A-116.6(a), (c) (Supp. 2000) (Hawaii mandates contraceptive coverage
regardless of whether such plan covers other prescriptions.); IOWA CODE ANN. §
514C.19(l)(a) (West Supp. 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 514C.19(1)(b) (West Supp. 2001);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 2756 (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(b)(1)-
(2) (1995-1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 689A.0415(1)(a) (Michie Supp. 1999); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 415:18-i (Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178(a) (1999); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-3-178(b) (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-57(a) (Supp. 2000); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 8, § 4099c(a) (Supp. 2000).
Prosthetic devices: MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-820(b) (1995-1997) (prosthetic devices
and orthopedic braces); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-834(b) (Supp. 2000) (post-mastectomy
prosthesis if insured/enrollee has not had breast reconstruction);
Scalp hair prostheses: MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-836(b) (Supp. 2000) (for hair loss
resulting from chemotherapy or radiation treatment for cancer); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
175, § 47T(b) (West 1998) (for hair loss resulting from cancer or leukemia treatment); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 62A.28 (West 1996) (for hair loss resulting from alopecia areata); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 415:18-d(I) (1998) (for hair loss resulting from alopecia areata, alopiecia
totalis, alopecia medicamentosa or permanent loss of scalp hair due to injury);
Alcohol/drug addiction/mental illness treatment: Twenty-three states require coverage for
alcoholism and sixteen require insurers to offer an option of coverage for alcoholism. Jana
K: Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with Good Intentions: Problems and
Potentialfor Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under ERISA, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 29,
35 n.40 (1999). Thirteen states require coverage for drug abuse treatment and ten require
insurance plans to offer an option of coverage for such therapy. Id. at n.43. Fifteen states
require coverage for mental illness and sixteen require states to offer an option for such
coverage. Id. at n.41. See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.365 (Michie 2000) (alcoholism and
drug abuse); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2302(a) (1981-1997 & Supp. 2001) (drug abuse, alcohol
abuse, and mental illness); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431M-2 (1993) (alcohol dependence, drug
dependence, and mental illness treatment services); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§
2842(3), 2843(5-C)(A) (West 2000) (alcoholism and other drug dependency pursuant to a
treatment plan, biologically based mental disorders); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62A. 149(Subd. 1)
(West 1996) (alcoholism, chemical dependency, or drug addiction); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 83-
9-27, 83-9-39 (1999) (alcoholism, mental illness); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.779(1) (Vernon
1991 & Supp. 2001) (alcoholism); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-703 (1999) (alcoholism, drug
addiction, and mental illness); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-a(I) (1998 & Supp. 2000)
(mental illnesses and emotional disorders which are subject to "significant improvement
through short-term therapy"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:25-2.1.5 (West 1996) (alcoholism,
biologically based mental illness); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2601(a), 2602(b) (2000)
(alcohol and drug dependency, mental conditions); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51-9 § 2A(a),
3.51-14 §3(a) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2001) (chemical dependency, serious mental illness);
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3412.1(B), 38.2-3412.1:01 (Michie 1999) (mental health, substance
abuse, and biologically based substance abuse);
Fertility/in vitro fertilization: Twelve states require coverage, and two require insurers to
offer an option of coverage. Strain & Kinney, supra, at 35 n.45. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 15-810(b)(1) (1995-1997 & Supp. 2000); TEx. INS. CODE art. 3.51-6 § 3A(a) (West
Supp. 2001);
Home health care: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2837 (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 15-808(c) (1995-1997); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216(i)(6) (McKinney 2000);
Hospice care: MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-809 (1995-19; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.11
(Michie 1999);
Dental, vision, and hearing care: ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.385(a) (2000);
Treatment for speech, hearing, and language disorders: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175,
§ 47U (West Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:26-2.1p (West Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE
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of the states have enacted laws prohibiting health insurance providers from
requiring genetic testing as a condition of coverage or from denying insurance or
charging higher rates based upon the results of genetic tests. 126 Approximately
1000 different state mandates concerning health insurance coverage have been
issued by state legislatures. 127
III. ExisTiNG CONCEPTIONS OF MORAL FAIRNESS
The large body of federal and state legislation discussed above evidences a deep
concern about moral fairness in the realm of health insurance. Hundreds of laws
have been passed in the United States that seek to enhance equity and fair
distribution of health care services. The laws, however, are all limited in scope and
confined in their reach. They do not create a regulatory system that provides
comprehensive protection to health insurance beneficiaries or clear guidance as to
how moral fairness can be achieved in the realm of health insurance. The
shortcomings of existing legislation are not surprising in light of the fact that the
concept of moral fairness is elusive and difficult to define.' 
28
The following Part discusses different conceptions of moral fairness that have
been offered by a variety of scholars. Some involve a redistribution of resources in
order to achieve a measure of equality, and other models are process-oriented,
envisioning the promotion of moral fairness through the establishment of fair
decisionmaking procedures. Each model has its shortcomings, but each also can
contribute to our understanding of the concept of moral fairness. Drawing upon
different aspects of the various theories, I will later develop my own analytical
model.
A. Equality of Resources
One understanding of moral fairness is equality of resources, whereby each
individual receives equal resources no matter what level of satisfaction the fixed
amount will allow her to attain.' 29 Thus, each individual, for example, would be
given $1000 per year for purposes of health care. ResoUrces would consequently be
redistributed so that all individuals would receive an equal dollar amount regardless
of their social and economic status.
The problem with this approach is that while healthy people might be able to
purchase more than enough care to meet their needs with the allocated amount, sick
ANN. § 56-7-2603(a)(1) (2000);
Second opinion in the event of positive or negative cancer diagnosis: N.Y. INS. LAW §
3216(i)(19)(A) (McKinney 2000);
Medical foods that are necessary for treatments of particular conditions: MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. §§ 15-807(a)(4), (c) (1995-1997); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216 (i)(21) (McKinney 2000);
Gastric bypass surgery or other medically recognized methods to treat morbid obesity:
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.13(A) (Michie Supp. 2000).
126. Rothstein & Hoffman, supra note 21, at 867.
127. New Study Shows 992 Mandated Benefits in the States, supra note 20, at 6;
Korobkin, supra note 20, at 2.
128. Other reasons for legislative shortcomings are discussed infra Part V.A.
129. Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
Arr. 185, 186 (1981).
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people would remain miserably underserved, because $1000 would cover only a
small fraction of their needs. In the alternative, if each individual were provided a
dollar amount that would be sufficient to cover her care if she became very sick,
say $200,000, the required budget would be astronomical and unrealistic for a
society with limited resources.
B. Equality of Welfare
In the alternative, one might argue that just distribution requires equality of
welfare and thus, that resources be allocated to make all individuals equally happy
or successful, even if the actual distribution of resources is highly unequal. 30 Thus,
if one individual can attain a threshold level of satisfaction with her health by
spending $1000, and another individual will attain that threshold level of
satisfaction only if she spends $10,000, society should give $1000 to the first
person and $10,000 to the second. The concept of equality of welfare, however,
raises the problem of "expensive tastes." 131 In the words of Ronald Dworkin,
"[e]quality of welfare seems to recommend that those with champagne taste, who
need more income simply to achieve the same level of welfare as those with less
expensive tastes, should have more income on that account.'
32
Dworkin provides the example of a parent who wishes to divide his estate
among five children: one blind, another a playboy with expensive tastes, a third an
ambitious politician who must finance his campaigns, a fourth a poet with modest
needs, and a fifth a sculptor who requires costly material. Equality of welfare
would dictate that the children with expensive tastes or needs receive larger
portions than the others.' 33 In the health care arena, one would similarly have to
defer to individual preferences under the equality of welfare principle. If one
person was content living with certain aches and functional limitations that could
be alleviated with medication while another insisted that she is miserable without
expensive plastic surgery that will enhance her social and career opportunities,
society would have to leave the first untreated and provide the surgery to the
second so that she too could be content.
C. Equality of Opportunity
A much more persuasive conception of moral fairness in the context of health
insurance is one offered by Norman Daniels. Daniels views moral fairness as being
achieved when all individuals are given, an equal opportunity to enjoy and succeed
in life. 134 He therefore believes that society has an obligation to provide all its
members with health care services "that promote normal functioning."'' 35 He draws
an analogy to education, explaining that health care, like education, is essential to
130. See Dworkin, supra note 129, at 186; JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE 237-52 (1996); Maxwell J. Mehlman, the Law of Above Averages: Leveling the
New Genetic Enhancement Playing Field, 85 IOwA L. REV. 517, 543 (2000).
131. Dworkin, supra note 129, at 228.
132. Id.
133. See Dworkin, supra note 129, at 186-87.
134. DANIELS, supra note 15, at 10-11.
135. Id.
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the protection of fair equality of opportunity in society. 36
Another scholar, Lawrence Gostin, clearly explains the analogy as follows:
Government is prepared to provide a public education to all children of school
age. Access to education is presumably justified by the importance of education
in furnishing fair opportunities for all children, irrespective of their social or
economic class. Like education, a certain level of health care is essential to a
person's ability to pursue life's opportunities on some roughly equitable basis.
Health care, at least in some fundamental ways, is as important to equal
opportunity as education. While health care does not provide opportunities by
facilitating basic knowledge and skill, it does so by enabling the person to
function mentally and physically in the application of that knowledge and
skill.' 37
A similar vision is embraced by the Nobel Prize-winning economist, Amartya
Sen, who speaks not of health care, but of economic development. Dr. Sen argues
that wealth is useful not as an end in itself, but because it allows individuals to
achieve substantive freedom and to live lives that are valuable in their own eyes. 38
Economic welfare should therefore be evaluated in terms of the capabilities it
affords people, that is, what individuals are actually doing with their lives and what
they have the opportunity to do. 139 By extension, it could be assumed that Sen
would argue that health care is important because it affords patients the opportunity
to live valuable and satisfying lives, free from the constraints of debilitating illness.
Norman Daniels's model, like those previously discussed, is vulnerable to
criticism. It does not provide clear guidance concerning many important questions.
What does "normal functioning" mean? Who will decide what "normal
functioning" is? In order to promote "normal functioning," should people be given
state-of-the-art care (for example, expensive magnetic resonance imaging for every
injury), experimental therapy, or just standard therapy in every case? In sum, how
exactly should Daniel's concepts be translated into practice? 140 Nevertheless, in
suggesting that, to the extent possible, all individuals should be brought to a
baseline level of physical and mental functioning through adequate health care,
Daniels provides a useful model for moral fairness.
D. Significant Net Health Benefits
Another commentator argues that coverage should be extended to health care
services that are proved to provide a "significant net health benefit."' 4' He suggests
that "net health benefit" be defined in the following terms: "the expected health
benefit (that is, increased life expectancy, relief of pain, reduction in anxiety,
improved functional capacity) exceeds the expected negative consequences (that is,
mortality, morbidity, anxiety of anticipating the procedure, pain produced by the
136. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 46-47 (1985).
137. Gostin, supra note 9, at 27.
138. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 14 (1999).
139. Id. at 75, 85.
140. See David C. Hadorn, Emerging Parallels in the American Health Care and Legal-
Judicial Systems, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 73, 86 (1992).
141. Id. at 92.
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procedure, time lost from work)."' 14 2 Before mandating coverage of a particular
treatment, policymakers could be required to show that a net health benefit is
"reasonably expected," "reasonably well demonstrated," or "cleafly demonstrated,"
depending on how strict society wishes its standard of proof to be.1
43
The net health benefit standard, like all other standards, is somewhat vague. It
will often be impossible to measure with exactitude elements such as pain, relief,
and anxiety, and therefore determining the "net benefit" of a particular therapy
could be extremely difficult. Moreover, the net health benefits model does not
adequately consider the cost of treatments. 144 Society could not afford to provide all
services with a net health benefit to all people. This is especially true in the case of
therapies that are not "medically necessary."1 45 Treatments such as plastic surgery
that often have a net health benefit because they make people feel better about
themselves, but as a luxury, are unlikely to be included in any national benefits
package and are not essential to the fulfillment of a moral fairness mandate.
Nevertheless, the net health benefits model is instructive in that it urges
policymakers to consider the advantages and disadvantages of various treatments
when contemplating coverage decisions.
E. The Veil of Ignorance
The philosopher John Rawls focuses on the process of decisionmaking. He
argues that in an ideal world, policymakers would establish policy principles from
behind a "veil of ignorance" that would prevent them from knowing their
individual traits or having insight into what their futures hold. ' 46 Since the
142. Id. (citing Tolls R. Park et al., Physician Ratings of Appropriate Indications for Six
Medical and Surgical Procedures, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 766, 767 (1986)).
143. Id.
144. The author addresses the cost issue as follows:
Importantly, consideration of treatment effectiveness and net benefit judgments
would take place without direct regard to the costs of services. Service costs
would be considered indirectly during the formulation of guidelines, however,
since judgments of net health benefit require that the expected harms or risks of
treatment be weighed against the value of any expected health benefits.
Importantly, these burdens often are directly correlated with the financial costs
of that treatment. For example, patients subjected to several days in an
intensive care unit or to major surgery often pay a heavy physical and
psychological toll for any benefits that they receive. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 93.
145. For a discussion of the difficulties of determining which treatments are in fact
"medically necessary," see infra Part IV.B.
146. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (1999). Specifically, Rawls writes that for
the veil of ignorance to exist, the following must be true:
First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status;
nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities,
his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his
conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the
special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to
optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not know
the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its
economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has
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decisionmakers would be ignorant of how they might personally be affected by the
rules, they would create policies that would be fair to everyone. The veil of
ignorance would ensure that no individual policymaker could incorporate elements
that would be to her personal advantage or to the disadvantage of another particular
individual or group. 147
In the area of health care, it is realistically impossible for policymakers to
function behind a true Rawlsian veil of ignorance in formulating coverage
decisions. 148 Policy officials will be aware of their own traits and health status, and
in light of family histories or genetic testing, they may even know what illnesses
they are likely to develop in the future.
Ronald Dworkin, however, relies on the veil of ignorance concept in developing
the "prudent insurance" approach to just distribution of health'services.149 Dworkin
bases his approach on three assumptions that would be present in an ideal world:
(1) the distribution of wealth and income among Americans is as equal as possible;
(2) every American has state-of-the-art knowledge about the value, cost, and side
effects of all medical procedures; and (3) no one has any information concerning
how likely any particular individual is to suffer from any specific disease or to be
injured in any kind of accident. 15 Dworkin argues that moral fairness will be
achieved if all individuals receive a level of health care that most people would
think prudent for themselves if the above conditions existed. 15 Therefore, if nearly
all prudent people would buy insurance covering routine medical care, necessary
hospitalization, prenatal and well-child care, and preventive medicine, a universal
health care system should provide such care to all Americans.' 52 By contrast, if
most prudent insureds of average income would not wish to pay high premium
prices to cover expensive treatment for unconscious, demented, or terminally ill
patients or for babies with severe defects who are unlikely to live more than a few
weeks, then moral fairness would not demand coverage for such services.' 53
Dworkin himself, however, acknowledges that different people would apply the
prudent insurance test differently and reach different conclusions concerning
been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information
as to which generation they belong.
Id. at 137.
147. Id. at 136 ("Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which
put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own
advantage.").
148. Id. at 118.
149. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 311 (2000).
150. Id. at 311-12.
151. Id. at 314-15.
152. Id. at 315.
153. Id. Dworkin summarizes his approach as follows:
The test asks what people would decide to spend on their own medical care, as
individuals, if they were buying insurance under fair free-market conditions,
and it insists, first, that we as a nation should spend what individuals would
spend, collectively, under those conditions; and, second, that we should use that
aggregate expenditure to make sure that all have now, as individuals, what they
would have then.
Id. at 317.
[Vol. 78:659
UNMANAGED CARE: TOWARDS MORAL FAIRNESS
particular treatments.'5 4 His proposal, therefore, offers only a way of thinking about
moral fairness in the health care arena but not a clear formula for achieving it.
Dworkin concludes that policymakers must obtain input from a variety of groups
that are likely to reach different conclusions about what services should and should
not be covered.155
F. Participatory Process
By asserting that input must be obtained from a broad spectrum of sources,
Dworkin suggests that a participatory decisionmaking process should be
established. The question of how essential policy decisions should be reached in a
diverse and democratic society has occupied the minds of many other thinkers as
well.
The philosopher Hannah Arendt conceived of the public realm as based upon
the "simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the
common world presents itself and for which no common measurement or
denominator can ever be devised."' 56 Arendt emphasized the importance of
maintaining the natural diversity of aspects and perspectives with which the public
views the common world.' 57 Another scholar, Iris Marion Young, develops a
conception of communicative democracy. 158 She argues that if individuals wish to
address collective problems, they must acknowledge and understand one another's
perspectives and recognize that their own perspectives are limited. 159 She views
democratic discourse as involving communication of differences, an understanding
of which enables society to make just and wise decisions.160 In the words of yet
another commentator, "justice ... involves reconciling diversities into a restored
and new multiple unity. Justice requires a unity of differences; mutuality and
incorporation rather than annihilation of opposites and distinctions."
6
'
Different members of American society will, therefore, continue to disagree
about precisely which coverage mandates maximize the just distribution of health
care services. What is important is to construct a means by which we can achieve
moral compromise even without moral consensus.
A theoretical basis for this approach can be drawn from the area of
organizational ethics, embodied in the "stakeholder theory of the modern
corporation."'162 The theory, which can be applied to health care entities, argues that
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 57 (1958).
157. Id. at 57-58.
158. IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 112 (2000).
159. Id. at 118 ("Paying specific attention to differentiated social groups in democratic
discussion and encouraging public expression of their situated knowledge thus often makes
it more possible than it would otherwise be for people to transform conflict and
disagreement into agreement.").
160. Id. at 115-16 ("Inclusion of and attention to socially differentiated positions in
democratic discussion tends to correct biases and situate the partial perspectives of
participants in debate.").
161 . JANE FLAX, The Play of Justice, in DISPUTED SUBJECTS: ESSAYS ON
PSYCHOANALYSIS, POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 111, 123-24 (1993).
162. R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modem Corporation, in
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business managers must focus on the following question: "[f]or whose benefit and
at whose expense should the firm be managed?"' 163 In other words, it is essential to
identify and respond to all stakeholders in company policy, which include not only
stockholders, but also suppliers, customers, employees, and the local community.'64
One theorist, R. Edward Freeman, identifies six ground rules for ethical corporate
behavior, several of which establish fair process. 1
65
In the arena of health insurance coverage it is likewise important to identify all
stakeholders and to obtain input from them for decisionmaking purposes.
Stakeholders will include patients, doctors, medical researchers, sponsors of
research, 166 and insurers. In order to promote moral fairness, it is essential to
establish a process by which the meaningful participation of all stakeholder groups
is guaranteed.
IV. A NEW ANALYTICAL METHOD: THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL FAIRNESS
No existing model provides a comprehensive answer to the question of what
constitutes moral fairness in health insurance coverage. Drawing upon different
aspects of the theories critiqued above, however, some general principles can be
delineated to guide policy officials in making morally fair coverage decisions.
These principles address several different priorities. The first, universality,
mandates a redistribution of resources to address the problem of the uninsured. The
next two provide specific guidelines for the crafting of coverage decisions and the
establishment of an acceptable classification system. Next, the methodology of
decisionmaking is addressed by the principle of participatory process. The final two
principles argue for the rejection of approaches that are inappropriate for health
PERSPECTIVES IN BUSINESS ETHICS 171 (Laura Pincus Hartman ed., 2002).
163. Id. at 172.
164. Id. at 171.
165. Id. at 179. The rules are the following:
1) "The Principle of Entry and Exit." Contracts must have clearly defined
entry, exit, and renegotiation conditions, or at least have methods or processes
for defining these conditions.
2) 'The Principle of Governance." Procedures for changing the rules of the
game must be decided by unanimous consent.
3) "The Principle of Externalities." If a contract between two parties
imposes costs on a third party, the third party should have the option of
becoming a party to the contract, and the terms of the contract should be
renegotiated.
4) "The Principle of Contracting Costs." All parties to the contract must
share in the costs of contracting.
5) "The Agency Principle." All agents should serve the interests of all
stakeholders.
6) "The Principle of Limited Immortality." The corporation should be run as
though it can continue to serve the interests of stakeholders indefinitely.
Id.
166. Sponsors of medical research include pharmaceutical companies, governmental
agencies such as NIH, and all others who sponsor and pay for research. Stuart E. Lind,
Financial Issues and Incentives Related to Clinical Research and Innovative Therapies, in
THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 193-94 (Harold J. Vanderpool ed.,
1996).
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care coverage determinations.
A. Universality
The first principle addresses the problem of the unjust distribution of health care
resources. In the United States, a large segment of the population is uninsured., 67 A
system that does not embrace the value of universality cannot be considered
morally fair. 168 If some members of society have hope of living long and
comfortable lives and others are deprived of that hope because they know that
when they become ill their needs will be neglected, the system does not justly
distribute its resources. The principle of universality grows out of the concept of
social pooling. 169 Insurance already is understood as a mechanism for risk
spreading among a large group of people, in order to protect each member from
potentially devastating financial loss.' 70 It is not perceived as a luxury reserved for
the elite that should be unavailable to people without financial means. In the last
decade there has been growing discomfort with the failure of the American system
to provide health care coverage to its entire population and many proposals for
reform have been made.' 7' Studies have shown that the uninsured in this country
suffer a decline in health when compared to those with insurance, and therefore,
lack of health benefits is in fact associated with adverse health outcomes. 72 Laws
such as HIPAA and EMTALA have already taken steps to reduce the number of
uninsured and to ensure that every American can receive at least a minimal level of
emergency care. 173 Following these precedents, therefore, it would be natural to
extend the concept of social pooling even further, to include everyone within the
covered pool.
Universality is also consistent with many of the theories of moral fairness
described above. Equality of resources, equality of welfare, and equality of
opportunity are all models that contemplate equality of one character or another for
all members of a society. None of these models supports the exclusion of a large
segment of society based on its inability to pay for adequate health care.
167. Over 42 million Americans are uninsured. See Blakely, supra note 8, at 1;
Schroeder, supra note 8, at 847.
168. See Dan W. Brock & Norman Daniels, Ethical Foundations of the Clinton
Administration's Proposed Health Care System, 271 JAMA 1189, 1189 (1994); Zoloth,
supra note 10, at 36.
169. See supra Part I.B.2.
170. Id.
171. See infra Part V.C.I.
172. David W. Baker et al., Lack of Health Insurance and Decline in Overall Health in
Late Middle Age, 345 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1106, 1108 (2001). The study, which involved
7577 individuals between the ages of fifty-one and sixty-one, found that "continuously
uninsured participants were 63 percent more likely than the privately insured participants to
have a decline in their overall health between 1992 and 1996 and 23 percent more likely to
have a new physical difficulty that affected walking or climbing stairs (i.e., a difficulty with
mobility)."Id. These findings were consistent with conclusions from two previous, smaller
studies. Id. See also Jack Hadley, Sicker and Poorer: The Consequences of Being
Uninsured, The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (May 2002) available
at http://www.kff.org/content/2002/20020510.
173. See supra Part I.C.
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Evidence that universality is a widely accepted principle can be drawn from
international experience. All other developed countries in the world provide
universal coverage to their populations. 174 Chile has gone as far as to adopt a
constitutional provision that guarantees its residents a right to buy private health
insurance. '
Universality is not an uncontroversial proposition and may be in tension with
other important values such as high quality of care and prudent resource allocation.
In light of budgetary constraints and finite economic resources, as coverage is
extended to people who cannot pay for it, the quality of medical care received by
those who currently have insurance could deteriorate. 76 Furthermore, in order to
reduce the number of uninsured significantly, the government would have to
increase its spending on health care and possibly cut other programs that enhance
public welfare and safety.' 77 Universality may require significant trade-offs, and
there is no definitive answer to the question of how an optimal balance can be
achieved. Nevertheless, a morally fair system of health coverage cannot be
indifferent to the problem of the uninsured and should promote the principle of
universality. 1
78
174. Andre Hampton, Markets, Myths, and A Man on the Moon: Aiding and Abetting
America's Flight from Health Insurance, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 987, 992 (2000); Gostin,
supra note 9, at 17; Donald W. Light, Health Care for All, COMMONWEAL February 22,
2002, at 14 ("Now that South Africa has legislated universal access to medical services, the
United States remains the only industrialized or second-tier country in the world that fails to
guarantee its citizens access to medical services.").
175. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care Regulation: Can We Learn from Others?
The Chilean Experience, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 863, 866 (1999). The provision reads:
The Right to Health Protection
The State protects free and equal access to actions for the promotion,
protection, and recovery of health and for rehabilitation of the individual.
The coordination and control of the activities related to health shall also rest
with the State. A primary duty of the State is to guarantee the execution of
health activities, whether provided by public or private institutions, in the
manner and under the conditions established by law, which may provide for
mandatory payments.
Each person shall have the right to choose the health system, whether State
or private, that he wishes to join.
Id.
176. See Henry N. Butler, The Political Market for Mandated Health Care Benefits
Under the Proposed National Health Security Act, 3 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 118
(1993/1994) (discussing President Clinton's proposed health care reform, which mandated
universal coverage and insurance premium caps, and warning that it would lead to reduced
use of services, "substitution of alternative, lower-cost services," and to some insureds
having to forgo care in various instances). The problem, however, could be addressed
through opt-out provisions and supplemental policies. See discussion infra Part V.D.2.
177. See id. at 117 (stating that "Medicaid has become the fastest growing item in state
budgets, crowding out expenditures for schools, roads, and prisons."). See also David M.
Cutler, A Guide to Health Care Reform, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 13, 24 (1994) (explaining that
"universal coverage requires subsidies and thus increased federal spending" and, in addition,
that it could "provide incentives for some people who are working to leave the labor force"
since insurance will no longer be tied to employment in most cases.).
178. See Jonathan Cohn, Health Scare, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 24, 2001, at 19 (warning
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B. Priority Should Be Given to Standard Therapies that Are Medically Necessary
to Cure or Alleviate the Symptoms of Mental or Physical Impairments that
Substantially Limit Major Life Activities
The second and third principles address not the question of who should be
included in the system, but the issue of which services should be covered in a
national benefits package in order to avoid unfair discrimination in coverage termg.
It is important to ensure that those who need health care services the most and can
benefit from them to the greatest extent receive the needed treatments. While some
seek medical intervention unnecessarily for viruses or common colds, many others
seek it because they have severe disabilities or life-threatening diseases. Health
care does its finest service when it saves lives, restores functionality, or diminishes
the consequences of lasting disability.
Norman Daniels articulates this view when he suggests that moral fairness will
be achieved if all members of society have an opportunity to receive health care
services "that promote normal functioning." 179 Daniels, however, does not
elucidate what constitutes "normal functioning." To refine Daniel's proposal one
can turn to the ADA's definition of the term "disability."
The ADA defines "disability," in relevant part, as a "physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of...
[an] individual." 180 The federal regulations provide that major life activities
include, but are not limited to, functions such as "caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working."' 81 Accordingly, one cannot be said to be functioning normally if one
suffers from a "disability," as the term is defined by the ADA. Although a
universal, national health benefits package will not be able to provide all
Americans with all of the health care services they desire at all times, the package
should provide basic care to those who need it most. It should, therefore, include
standard therapies that are medically necessary to cure or alleviate physical or
mental impairments that substantially limit major life activities.
The courts have decided many cases that evaluate what conditions actually
constitute disabilities for ADA purposes. While some of these cases may be a
useful resource for policy makers, many of them will be inapplicable in the health
care coverage context. For example, temporary conditions, such as infections that
that in light of rising unemployment and recession, the number of uninsured could increase
to 45 million by the end of 2002). For further discussion of the advantages, disadvantages,
and implications of universality, see infra Part V.D.
179. DANIELS, supra note 15, at 11.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1995). The regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA
explain that a physical or mental impairment means:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic
and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2001).
181. Id. § 1630.2(i).
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are treatable with antibiotics, are not considered disabilities for ADA purposes. 182 It
would be unreasonable to exclude from coverage therapies for conditions that are
ordinarily temporary, since these conditions are often easily and inexpensively
cured and could develop into much more serious and costly ailments if they are not
treated at their inception. Consequently, therapy for conditions that are debilitating
for a short period of time should be covered in a national benefits package.
Furthermore, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, 183 the Supreme Court ruled that an
individual whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or
other treatments does not have a "disability" and is not entitled to ADA
protection.184 A person with diabetes or epilepsy whose symptoms are effectively
controlled by drug therapy, therefore, will not be considered disabled according to
the Supreme Court. This decision would obviously be inapplicable in the health
insurance context because it would be ludicrous to exclude from coverage
treatments that are necessary to control the symptoms of serious illnesses in order
to render them nondisabling. The. Sutton case, in fact, seems to assume that
everyone has access to all necessary medications and medical devices.
The term "disability" can provide useful guidance by elucidating that priority
should be given to standard treatments that eliminate or alleviate physical and
mental impairments that substantially limit major life activities. Policymakers must
use discretion, however, when turning to cases that have interpreted the term under
the ADA.
A few more details regarding the standard should be noted. The principle
mandates coverage for treatment of both physical and mental conditions and thus
follows in the footsteps of the MHPA, which sought to diminish the disparity in
coverage between the two types of ailments. 185 There is no morally fair justification
for discriminating against those who require treatment for disabling mental
conditions and ignoring their serious needs. 186 Mental illness can be as debilitating
as physical illness when it prevents people from working and caring for
themselves, and it can be life-threatening if violent tendencies or suicidal ideations
develop.
The principle is cost-sensitive in that it requires coverage only for standard
therapy and not for experimental or unconventional treatments. In light of limited
182. The federal regulations establish that three factors should be considered in
determining whether one is substantially limited in a major life activity:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long
term impact of or resulting from the impairment.
Id. § 1630.20)((2).
183. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
184. Id. at 482-83. The case involved severely myopic airplane pilots who were denied
employment by United Airlines and subsequently challenged United's minimum vision
requirement. The Court ruled that they were not "disabled" under the ADA because their
vision was corrected with eyeglasses, and thus they were not entitled to statutory protections.
Id. at 488.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (Supp. 2002).
186. See Light, supra note 174, at 14 ("mild depression and anxiety disorders.., cripple
the spirit as well as the body and can be more physically disabling than many physical
disorders.") (emphasis in original).
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resources and the need for prioritization, the national benefits package need not
include treatments that are unproven or of questionable efficacy. Furthermore, the
principle requires coverage only for therapy that is deemed medically necessary to
treat the condition at issue and therefore incorporates the "medically necessary"
standard that governs Medicare coverage.'
87
It must be acknowledged that the concept of "medical necessity" is itself
problematic. 188 First, there is often disagreement among physicians as to which
treatments are medically necessary. Studies have found significant differences in
the rates of utilization of certain procedures among similar patient populations.
Cesarean section surgeries, coronary artery bypass surgeries, and pacemaker
implantations are performed more or less frequently in different settings, with little
correlation to patient need. 89 In one study conducted in Great Britain, twenty-five
nephrologists were presented with forty patients and were asked to choose thirty for
kidney disease treatment, based on supposedly established medical criteria. Only
thirteen were deemed by all of the physicians to need treatment, and none was
rejected by every doctor.' 90
A second potential problem is that the concept of medical necessity creates a
system of professional dominance, allowing doctors to determine independently
what care patients will receive rather than providing patients with choices and
allowing them to make autonomous decisions based on their own perceived needs
and preferences. If the system requires doctors to make rigid or formulaic
judgments about "medical necessity" without considering their patients' unique
circumstances and personal descriptions of significant pain, discomfort, or anxiety,
the system might force doctors sometimes to neglect their patients' most pressing
physical and psychological needs.
Nevertheless, in order to be economically viable, a national benefits package
would have to limit the services it covers. Some decisions concerning what
187. The Social Security Act provides that services eligible for Medicare coverage must
be "reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve
the functioning of a malformed body member." 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (1992).
188. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The American Difference in Health Care Costs: Is There
A Problem? Is Medical Necessity the Solution? 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 13 (1999). The author
notes that the term "medical necessity" can have a variety of different definitions. He states
the following:
First, it might mean that a procedure or test is simply not appropriate or
effective for addressing a patient's condition. (citation omitted). Second, it
might mean that the marginal value of a test or treatment (that is generally
accepted as appropriate) over the next best test or treatment for the same
condition is likely to be minimal in comparison to the marginal cost of the test
or treatment over the next best test or treatment. (citation omitted). Third, it
might mean that whether or not the test or procedure is beneficial to the patient
is not known, or is not yet fully known: the procedure is experimental. (citation
omitted).
Id.
189. Id. at 2 (noting that in the United States the use of cesarean section increased from
5% to 25% between 1965 and 1988 and is performed between 9.6% and 31.8% of the time
in different settings, suggesting frequent inappropriate or unnecessary use of the procedure).
190. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 239, 267 (1985).
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constitutes standard therapy or medically necessary care will admittedly be
controversial. Certain safeguards against irresponsible decisionmaking will be
suggested below. These include the establishment of a central governmental agency
that will continuously review emerging data concerning treatment efficacy and
developing technology, supplemental insurance that will cover services not
included in the national package, and a mechanism allowing patients to appeal
adverse coverage decisions.
19 1
Finally, the principle is consistent not only with Daniels's fair opportunity for
normal functioning model, but also with Dworkin's prudent insurance theory' 92 and
the significant net health benefit theory of moral fairness.193 It is reasonable to
assume that individuals of average means who know nothing about their future
health status would purchase coverage for standard treatments that are medically
necessary to cure or alleviate the symptoms of impairments that substantially limit
major life activities. Few would wish to be left untreated for severe impairments.
Furthermore, therapies that are medically necessary and are proven effective in
treating disabling conditions will generally have a net health benefit because the
positive gains from their use will outweigh any potential negative consequences.
C. Priority Should Be Given to Standard Preventative Care
Based again upon Norman Daniels's argument that all individuals should have
the opportunity to receive health care that promotes normal functioning, the
national benefits package should give. priority to standard preventive care. 194
Medical interventions such as immunizations, routine check-ups, pap smears, and
well-child visits, should be covered by a national benefits package because they are
potentially life-saving, and they reduce the likelihood that individuals will suffer
long-term disability or prolonged pain from serious illnesses. Diseases that are
detected at their earliest stages can often be treated relatively quickly, with few, if
any, long-term effects for patients. Moral fairness cannot be achieved if those
without financial means do not have access to detection and prevention
mechanisms that could save their lives.
This principle, like its predecessor, is consistent not only with Daniels's concept
of equal opportunity for normal functioning, but also with the prudent insurance
model and the significant net health benefits concept. Because prevention and early
detection of disease can be invaluable in enhancing the quality and length of one's
life, it is reasonable to assume that an average prudent purchaser of insurance
would find preventive care to be a worthwhile investment. In addition, the health
benefits of routine check-ups, vaccinations and standard diagnostic tests generally
outweigh their negative consequences, such as pain or anxiety, which are often
191. See infra Part V.C.2 and V.D.2.
192. See supra Part III.E.
193. See supra Part III.D.
194. In some cases patients might seek extreme or experimental preventative measures.
For example, patients who learn they have the BRCAI or BRCA2 genetic abnormalities that
indicate a high susceptibility to breast and ovarian cancer might seek prophylactic
masteitomies or oophorectomies. See Rothstein & Hoffman, supra note 21, at 878. This
principle does not require coverage of nonstandard prophylactic measures.
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negligible. 195
D. A Participatory Process Must Be Established
Of great importance to the promotion of moral fairness is the establishment of a
participatory decisionmaking process. No matter what general principles are
adopted, they will still be vague, contain words that are ambiguous, and require
case-by-case assessments in individual circumstances. For example, when
implementing the principles articulated above, decisionmakers will need to grapple
with the meaning of terms such as "standard treatment," "medically necessary,"
"substantially limit," "major life activity," and "preventive care." No general
principles can escape such ambiguities because medical knowledge and technology
are ever-evolving, and patient needs are specific and unpredictable.
Furthermore, the requirements of moral fairness cannot be scientifically or
empirically ascertained. We are a morally pluralistic society. 96 In a diverse and
democratic society, the government can impose policies on individuals but cannot
dictate their way of thinking. Therefore, there can never be absolute consensus as
to which policies are in fact morally fair. 197 In philosophical terms, moral fairness
is .an "essentially contested concept," a concept for which there is no single
definition that can be deemed "the correct or standard use."' 98 The best we can
hope for is to develop a thoughtful and reliable process for the development of
national coverage guidelines that are as fair as possible. A just and legitimate
process can be established even without universal agreement as to the precise
meaning of the term "moral fairness."' 99
195. It is important to note that in economic terms, preventive care is not necessarily
efficient since it often does not reduce medical expenditures. Rather, prevention often
"offers better health at additional cost .... LOUISE B. RUSSELL, IS PREVENTION BETrER
THAN CURE? vii (1986). The author uses the example of blood pressure testing. Although the
test itself is very inexpensive, testing the entire population every year or two in doctors'
offices generates high costs. In addition, those whose blood pressure is deemed high must be
retested and evaluated thoroughly prior to treatment. Medication for hypertension can also
cost several hundred dollars per year. Although early treatment of hypertension might
prevent patients from suffering some illnesses, studies have calculated that in fact, the costs
of treatment are far larger than the savings. Id. at 4. See also id. at 109-12 (summarizing the
author's conclusions concerning the cost of preventive care).
196. Martin Benjamin, Between Subway and Spaceship: Practical Ethics at the Outset of
the Twenty-first Century, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July-Aug. 2001, at 24, 27 (citing JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (1971)).
197. Id. ("So long as people enjoy free association and the capacity to think and act for
themselves, there will be conflicts among good and important values and principles that are
not due to selfishness, prejudice, ignorance, poor reasoning, and so on.").
198. W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y
167, 168-69 (1956).
199. Under the model suggested in this Article, the participatory process would be guided
by the general principles developed above so that it would not be characterized by
arbitrariness and unpredictability.
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E. An Absolute Antidiscrimination Mandate Is Unrealistic
Moral fairness does not necessitate the implementation of an absolute
antidiscrimination mandate. In reality, no health care system can be completely
devoid of discrimination. A society that has limited resources to invest in health
200care will have to make rationing decisions and set certain priorities.
For example, we might opt against offering unlimited coverage or even any
coverage for fertility treatments because of their price. The average cost of an in-
vitro fertilization ("IVF") cycle is $8000, and often, multiple cycles are needed for
a successful pregnancy, so that delivery of a baby conceived through IVF can cost
tens of thousands of dollars. 20 1 Many experimental treatments 20 2 are also likely to
be excluded, even though patients with particular diseases such as AIDS or cancer
might be disproportionately affected.
A system that is workable and functions within the limitations of budgetary
constraints will therefore continue to feature exclusions and limitations that could
be considered discriminatory with respect to particular disabilities. Moral fairness
does not require that all discriminatory practices be eliminated, because such a
dictate would translate into a requirement of unlimited coverage in all instances
and, therefore, potential bankruptcy of the health coverage system, in which case
everyone would be worse off.
F. The Moral Culpability of Patients Should Not Be Considered By Policymakers
for Purposes of Coverage Decisions
Arguably, moral fairness requires consideration of the patient's moral
culpability and demands exclusion of coverage for treatment of illnesses or injuries
that the patient "deserves." One might contend. that health insurance should not
200. See DANIELS, supra note 15, at 164 ("we cannot provide everyone with all
beneficial services.") (emphasis in original); DANIELS ET AL., supra note 80, at 59 (stating
that society must make choices as to how much priority to give the sickest patients, how to
weigh significant benefits, for a few versus limited benefits for many, and how to define
"needed" and "effective" services.); Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A
Democratic Decisionmaking Approach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1603 (1992) ("There are
limits to what we as a society ought to spend on health care because there are other
competing social goods that make legitimate claims on that finite set of dollars. Hence, the
need for health care rationing is inescapable.").
201. Lisa Gubernick & Dana Wechsler Linden, Tarnished Miracle, FORBES, Nov. 6,
1995, at 98, 98. It should be noted that infertility has been deemed a disability by the
Supreme Court and thus individuals who suffer from infertility are entitled to protection
under the ADA. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998). Plaintiffs with infertility,
therefore, might challenge coverage limitations under the ADA. If a national benefits
package were to be established, the ADA might have to be amended to address the issue of
the program's potential conflicts with statutory requirements.
202. See Sharona Hoffman, A Proposal for Federal Legislation to Address Health
Insurance Coverage for Experimental and Investigational Treatments, 78 OR. L. REv. 203
(1999), arguing that Phase III clinical trials should be covered by health insurance in some
circumstances. While experimental treatments are likely to be excluded from coverage in the
basic, national health care package, some could be included in supplemental insurance
programs. See infra Part V.D.2.
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cover treatment of conditions that were caused by a patient's voluntarily chosen
behavior or risk-taking, such as smoking or car racing. 203 It is perhaps unfair to
raise premiums for those who are careful about their habits and take good care of
their health because of costly treatments needed by those who are irresponsible or
reckless. In addition, if parents know that their infant will be born with very severe
disabilities and choose not to abort the fetus, they arguably should not receive
reimbursement for the millions of dollars worth of treatment needed by their child,
because others will have to suffer the consequences of these high costs.
Morally fair coverage decisions, however, should not be based on judgments
regarding individuals' moral culpability. First, there is a problem of causation. The
precise cause of an illness is often difficult or even impossible to establish. A
patient's cancerous lung tumor might be the result of her smoking or might have
developed whether or not she smoked.204 Furthermore, individuals might engage in
risky or reckless behavior because of underlying mental illness or because they
were abused as children, and thus the conduct that leads to their injuries is not
purely their "fault." It might also be extremely difficult to determine whether the
patient engaged in hazardous behavior if she does not admit to doing so. Who will
monitor and record whether an individual smoked at any time in her life, ate an
excessive amount of fatty foods, or engaged in unprotected sexual activity?
Second, there is the danger of a slippery slope. While some might find the case
for denying coverage for treatment to a smoker or race car driver easy to make, it
would be extraordinarily difficult to establish ethical guidelines for which risk-
taking behavior deserves to be punished and where the line should be drawn. For
example, women who have no children are known to have an increased risk of
breast and ovarian cancer,20 5 and therefore, childless women could be considered
guilty of risk-taking behavior. Would society wish to punish them if they develop
those illnesses by denying reimbursement for their medical care? Treatment of a
severely disabled infant whose medical condition was known before birth raises
203. See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 283, 293 (1981). Dworkin distinguishes between option luck, which has to do
with "deliberate and calculated gambles," and brute luck, which results from risks that are
not deliberate gambles. He argues that society should remedy inequalities that result from
brute luck but that it owes nothing to those with inferior resources that are attributable to
option luck. Id. See also Robert M. Veatch, Voluntary Risks to Health: The Ethical Issues,
243 JAMA 50, 54 (1980) ("1 reach the conclusion that it is fair, that it is just, if persons in
need of health services resulting from true, voluntary risks are treated differently from those
in need of the same services for other reasons.").
204. Veatch, supra note 203, at 51. Veatch also notes that some voluntary risks are
undertaken by individuals for the benefit of society, as is the case with firefighters.
Certainly, those who risk their lives for the benefit of others should not be denied coverage
for treatments necessitated by their altruism. Id. at 53. See also Robert L. Schwartz, Life
Style, Health Status, and Distributive Justice, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 195, 205-06 (1993); Scot
D. Yoder, Individual Responsibility for Health: Decision, not Discovery, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 22, 28 ("determining causality for any state of affairs involves a
decision-a selection process in which we highlight certain causal factors and relegate
others to the background.").
205. American Cancer Society, Breast Cancer Facts & Figures 2001-2002, at 8 (Table
3); National Cancer Institute, Genetics of Breast and Ovarian Cancer (PDQ), at
http://www.nci.nih.gov (last visited Oct 15, 2002).
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even more sensitive and troubling questions. Although some parents might
continue the pregnancy simply because they do not contemplate its implications or
social costs, many will choose to have the baby because of deeply held religious
beliefs or ethical beliefs about the sanctity of unborn human life.
Many decisions are complex, multifaceted, or subconscious, so that human
actors themselves are unaware of all of their motivations and reasons for particular
conduct. Moreover, the ultimate evaluation required to assess true moral content is
frequently beyond the capacity of human ability. 2°6 It would often be impossible for
any social entity to judge the moral culpability of human beings with respect to
health-related behavior or reproductive decisions. Any attempt to do so would itself
be morally reprehensible and lead to arbitrary and capricious coverage
determinations. A morally fair coverage system, therefore, should not include
consideration of whether individuals deserve their medical problems or are to
blame for the health care costs they have generated.
V. ALTERNATIVES FOR THE PROMOTION OF MORAL FAIRNESS IN HEALTH
INSURANCE
A variety of mechanisms can be utilized to enhance moral fairness in health
insurance. This part will analyze four alternatives: the passage of additional.
legislation, deregulation of the insurance market, the establishment of a new
regulatory agency, and the implementation of a universal coverage mandate.
None of the options is devoid of potential hazards and disadvantages. Some,
however, are better than others. This part argues that legislative action constitutes
an inadequate remedy and that market deregulation is not advisable because the
market is characterized by significant flaws. By contrast, the establishment of a
federal regulatory agency and a universal coverage mandate hold significant
promise for the promotion of moral fairness.
A. Gaps and Shortcomings in the Current Legislative Scheme Could Be Corrected
Through Additional Legislation
1. Federal Legislation
Existing federal laws provide only limited protection to insurance customers.
Several of the laws apply only to employer-provided insurance benefits.20 7 Some
create significant defenses for insurers, which allow them to justify discriminatory
208benefit terms. Thus, insurers can establish AIDS caps, can refuse to cover
hearing aids, can often drastically limit or exclude coverage for mental health
care, 209 and can offer older employees far less insurance coverage than younger
workers. Moreover, none of the civil rights laws protects people on the basis of
206. In the words of the poet Yeats, "That only God, my dear / Could love you for
yourself alone / And not your yellow hair." William Butler Yeats, For Anne Gregory, in THE
COLLECTED POEMS OF W. B. YEATS 245 (Richard J. Finneran ed., 1983).
207. See, eg., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994); EPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994); ADEA,
29 U.S.C. § 621 (1999). See supra Part II.
208. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1995); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (1999).
209. See discussion of Mental Health Parity Act, supra Part II.
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economic status, which is often the most significant determinant of the level of
insurance obtainable by individuals. Consequently, we have in the United States
approximately 42 million uninsured people who are not eligible for Medicaid or
Medicare coverage.
210
One might suggest that enhanced protection against unfair discrimination should
be achieved through additional federal legislation. Congress, in fact, seems to be
perpetually inundated with new legislative proposals concerning specific coverage
mandates.2 11 Legislation could be designed to advance several of the principles of
moral fairness. Statutes could mandate coverage of standard preventive care and of
standard therapies that are medically necessary to cure or alleviate the symptoms of
mental or physical impairments that substantially limit major life activities. They
can also prohibit consideration of patients' moral culpability for purposes of
coverage decisions. Nevertheless, while specific statutes might provide quick fixes
for particular coverage gaps, the legislative approach is ultimately a severely
flawed mechanism by which to address the shortcomings of the health insurance
system.
Federal regulation that requires increasingly extensive coverage while leaving
the private insurance system otherwise unchanged could ultimately harm rather
than help the American public and could further undermine the value of
universality. With additional limitations on their risk classification practices,
insurance companies would likely continue to raise premiums in order to maintain
profitability. 212 In 2002 the cost of employer-provided health insurance rose by
14.7%,213 following an 11% increase in 2001 and an 8.3% increase in 2000.214 A
persistent trend in this direction could lead to adverse selection wherein low-risk
individuals opt out of the health insurance market and are not available to subsidize
210. See supra note 8.
211. For example, numerous bills prohibiting particular forms of discrimination or
proposing specific coverage mandates were introduced in the 106th Congress. These
included, among others, the following: Equity in Fertility Coverage Act of 2000, H.R. 4532;
Comprehensive Insurance Coverage of Childhood Immunization Act of 2000, H.R. 4563, S.
2444; Fair Access to Infertility Treatment and Hope Act of 2000, S. 2160; Bone Marrow
Blood Testing Coverage Act of 1999, H.R. 2021; Seniors' Access to Continuing Care Act of
1999, S. 1142; Mammogram Availability Act of 1999, H.R. 1132; Reconstructive Surgery
Act of 1999, S. 585; Hospital Length of Stay Act of 1999, H.R. 989, S. 265; Access to
Emergency Medical Services Act of 1999, S. 517; Osteoporosis Early Detection and
Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 925; Equity in Womens Health Act, S. 479; Screening
Mammography Act of 1999, H.R. 524; Breast Cancer Patient Protection Act of 1999, S. 681,
H.R. 116; Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1999, H.R.
306, S. 543.
212. See Kristin Olson-Garewal & Kristen Hessler, Arizona's Cancer Clinical Trials
Law: Flawed Process, Flawed Product, HASTINGS CENTER. REP., May-June 2001, at 22, 23
("Mandating specific insurance benefits assigns additional costs to insurers without
providing additional funds. The predictable result is an increase in premiums for private
insurers .... ").
213. Barbara Martinez, Health Benefits Post Highest Gain in Cost Since '90, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 9, 2002, at A6. For small to medium sized companies, the cost increase was 18.1%.
Id.
214. Amy Snow Landa, Health Insurance Prices Show Highest Increase Since 1992, AM.
MED. NEWS, Sept. 24, 2001, at 10.
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high-risk patients with significant medical costs. 215 Adverse selection could result
in a "death spiral" of premiums, which could destabilize or even bankrupt the
insurance industry.216
Furthermore, ever-increasing insurance costs could induce employers to stop
providing health insurance to their employees. Employers are not required by law
to provide insurance benefits 217 and do so at least in part because the cost of
supplying these benefits is tax deductible.2 18 According to one survey, eighty-five
percent of workers in firms with one-hundred or more employees are offered health
insurance coverage, but only fifty-seven percent of those in firms with fewer than
one-hundred employees, and thus more limited resources, are offered health
2 19benefits. While large employers often believe that offering insurance benefits
enhances their success in employee recruitment and retention, increases
productivity, and reduces absenteeism, many small employers indicate that they
choose not to provide employee benefits because of cost concerns. 22 With rising
expenses, fewer and fewer employers may choose to be generous with employees
in the realm of benefits, especially in times of recession and economic hardship. 2 1
Legislative mandates, in fact, mislead the public into believing that the
government can promote moral fairness at no cost. The laws place various
requirements and burdens on insurers without alerting insurance beneficiaries to the
cost consequences. The public demands additional laws, believing that it can enjoy
enhanced coverage protection while continuing to expect low out-of-pocket costs
and premiums. Legislative initiatives therefore obfuscate the tension between social
pooling and individual advantage.222
An additional objection is based on the fact that federal law often is not
sufficiently lucid. The statutes have generated considerable litigation, which is
215. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
216. Id.
217. See Jeffrey G. Lenhart, ERISA Preemption: The Effect of Stop-Loss Insurance on
Self-Insured Health Plans, 14 VA. TAX REV. 615, 618 (1995) ("employers are not required to
provide any health coverage to their workers."); Blakely, supra note 8, at 1 ("Employers are
not legally required to provide coverage to their workers, and individuals are not legally
required to maintain coverage.").
218. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health
Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 23, 25 (2001); Jerry L. Mashaw &
Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 478 (1994) (noting that "[e]mployer-based
health insurance receives a substantial tax subsidy through both its deductibility to the
employer and the failure of the Internal Revenue Code to count health insurance benefits as
income to the employee."); Larry M. Pollack, Medical Maloccurrence Insurance (MMI): A
First-Party, No-Fault Insurance Proposal for Resolving the Medical Malpractice
Controversy, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 552, 562 n.54 (1988) ("Under federal tax provisions,
employers can deduct the cost of their employee health insurance plans, and employees can
exempt both health insurance benefits and payments received through such benefits ... from
taxable income.").
219. Paul Fronstin & Ruth Helman, Small Employers and Health Benefits: Findings from
the 2000 Small Employer Health Benefits Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, Oct. 2000, at 4.
220. Id. at 4, 8, 15. For employers with 3 to 199 workers, the average cost of health
insurance is $189 per employee per month. Id. at 16.
221. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
222. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
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costly for plaintiffs, defendants, and taxpayers. Inconsistent decisions issued by
different courts also may cause confusion for insurers seeking judicial guidance
concerning insurance terms. 223 Federal antidiscrimination laws are the product of
extensive lobbying and political compromise. Consequently, they often contain
equivocal and imprecise language, which is open to varying interpretations.224
2. State Legislation
One might argue that regulation concerning health insurance coverage should be
left to the states. In 1945, in the McCarran-Ferguson Act,225 Congress delegated to
the states regulatory responsibility for insurance markets,226 and the states have
223. For example, courts have issued contradictory decisions concerning whether the
ADA regulates the contents of health insurance policies. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) ("an insurance office must be
physically accessible to the disabled but need not provide insurance that treats the disabled
equally with the non-disabled") (citation omitted); Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179
F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that the ADA "regulates only access and not content");
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3rd Cir. 1998) ("So long as every
employee is offered the same plan regardless of that employee's contemporary or future
disability status, then no discrimination has occurred even if the plan offers different
coverage for various disabilities."); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006,
.1012 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Title III does not govern the content of a long-term disability policy
offered by an employer.").
Some district courts have found to the contrary, and have held that the ADA regulates the
contents of insurance policies and requires insurers to provide actuarial justifications for
their disability-based distinctions. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1169
(E.D. Va. 1997) ("the Aetna plan's distinction between physical and mental disabilities may
survive scrutiny under the ADA only if it is based on actuarial principles or other competent
factual information."); World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
("[The ADA] requires that underwriting and classification of risks be based on sound
actuarial principles or be related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience."); Cloutier v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 964 F. Supp. 299, 304 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("insurers retain their
§ 501(c) exemption so long as their underwriting decisions are in accord with either (a)
sound actuarial principles, or (b) actual or reasonably anticipated experience."); Doukas v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 432 (D. N.H. 1996) ("while insurers retain the
ability to follow practices consistent with insurance risk classification accepted under state
law, these methods must still be based on sound actuarial principles or related to actual or
reasonably anticipated experience.").
224. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW:
AN ESSAY 34 (1997) (discussing the involvement of lobbyists in the crafting of legislative
history) Butler, supra note 176, at 115 (asserting that state mandates concerning health
insurance coverage have proliferated because of the influence of special interest groups).
225. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1997).
226. 15 U.S.C. § 1012. The statute provides in relevant part:
(a) State regulation
The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business.
(b) Federal regulation
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
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traditionally been the primary actors in this realm. State legislation, however, is
characterized by its own flaws and limitations,
State mandates will not protect those who are enrolled in self-funded employee
benefit plans 227 because under a federal law called ERISA,228 state laws regulating
insurance are preempted with respect to self-funded plans and cannot be
enforced.229 This exception is quite consequential because a growing number of
employers are self-insured. 230 One scholar estimates that in 1993, 93% of
employers with more than 40,000 employees were self-insured, as were eighty-five
percent of employers with 5000 to 40,000 employees, and 37% of those with 50 to
199 employees. 231 Furthermore, state regulation, like federal regulation, can
generate problems of adverse selection and reduced employee benefits and can lead
to costly litigation due to ambiguous drafting.
232
Piecemeal legislation does not necessarily promote overall moral fairness at
either state or federal level for yet another reason. Legislation is often a response to
public pressure and political concern. Groups with strong lobbyists or prominent
representatives might succeed in promulgating legislation that benefits their special
interests, while equally deserving groups may fail because of much weaker
lobbying abilities and less prominence. For example, end stage renal disease
patients are entitled to coverage of dialysis treatments under Medicare,233 though
the program does not extend benefits to nonelderly individuals with other diseases.
Similarly, the Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998 234 provides
significant benefits for breast cancer patients, 35 while those suffering from other
cancers do not have the benefit of legislation that addresses their specific coverage
issues. The absence of a comprehensive legislative remedy for the uninsured may
also be due in part to their generally weak political voice.
236
The point is illustrated most clearly, perhaps, by an Assembly Insurance
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance ....
Id.
227. Employers who choose self funded plans pay their employees' medical claims on
their own rather than contracting with a commercial insurer that collects premiums and
serves as a third party payer. Every medical claim translates into an out-of-pocket expense
for these employers. They are thus known as self-insured employers. Mark A. Rothstein, The
Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 281, 293-94 (Mark A. Rothstein ed.,
1997).
228. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1999).
229. See Hoffman, supra note 202, at 241-43; FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61
(1990) (We read the ... [statute] to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that
'regulat[e] insurance ....') (alterations in original).
230. Rothstein, supra note 227.
231. Id. at 234.
232. See discussion supra Part V.A.l.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr (Supp. 2002).
.234.29 U.S.C. § 1185b (Supp. 2002).
235. See supra Part II.
236. Stone, Managed Care, supra note 89, at 1215 ("the insured are more likely than the
uninsured to be active political constituents-people who vote and call their legislators to
complain or ask for help.").
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Committee Statement regarding a New Jersey law that mandates reimbursement for
the treatment of Wilm's tumor by high dose chemotherapy and an autologous bone
marrow transplant. 237 It states in relevant part;
This bill has been referred to as the "Tishna Rollo Bill." Tishna Rollo is an
eight-year-old Glen Ridge girl who is battling Wilm's tumor, a rare form of
cancer which generally affects the kidneys before spreading to other parts of
the body. Recently, Tishna's case has received much attention because her
doctors have concluded that the transplants are the one chance they have to
cure her disease, yet her family's health insurer initially refused to provide
coverage for the treatment because it asserted that such treatment was not
covered in her health insurance contract as it is considered "experimental" or
"investigational." Court action on the issue is pending. This bill will eliminate
the controversy surrounding the treatment and, in effect, absolve health
insurers, and ultimately the courts, of the responsibility of making any
determination regarding this issue. s
Promoting moral fairness through legislation is consistent with the principle of
participatory process, but only to a limited extent. Legislatures are democratically
elected and must respond to their constituents in order to build a base of support.239
However, in truth, not every patient is Tishna Rollo, with a high-profile case and
access to the media and legislators. Specific legislative mandates are often
influenced primarily by those with a strong political voice and not by the citizenry
as a whole. The legislative process, therefore, does not necessarily safeguard
overall moral fairness.
B. Health Insurance Regulation Could Be Abandoned so that Unregulated
Competition Shapes Moral Fairness
Another alternative is to abandon regulation of the health insurance market. If
American society in fact demands moral fairness with respect to health insurance
coverage, one might assume that health insurers would voluntarily incorporate that
value into their policies. Arguably, the competitive marketplace would, on its own,
safeguard moral fairness, because insurance policies with unfairly discriminatory
limitations and exclusions would be unappealing to consumers and would not be
purchased. The contents of insurance policies, therefore, would require no
regulation because the competitive market would not allow insurers who defied
moral fairness to survive.
Thus, the prominent scholar, Richard Epstein, argues that:
when direct and indirect effects are taken into account, the classical regimes of
contract, property, and tort do a better job in organizing our social relationships
than the torrent of regulations and judicial decisions that seek to create positive
rights to health care on the one hand, or interfere with the contractual choices
237. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6f note (West 1996) (Assembly Insurance Committee
Statement).
238. Id.
239. See Butler, supra note 176, at 115-16.
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of autonomous individuals on the other.240
Epstein acknowledges that the "undeniable problems of poor people in need is a
vital consideration ..... 24i He believes, however, that market transactions should
be supplemented primarily by care provided by charitable organizations, though he
does raise the possibility of limited public services that are supported by tax
dollars.
242
In the area of health care coverage, therefore, Epstein himself recognizes that
the free market does not fully serve societal needs. In my view, Epstein's
suggestions for remedying its deficiencies do not go far enough. Moral fairness
cannot be left largely to the forces of an unregulated market.
First, universality is not a market-driven principle. Extending coverage to those
who cannot afford to pay for it must be achieved through government regulation
since no rational seller would offer goods to those who have no means of
purchasing them.243 Leaving the care of the uninsured to charitable organizations is
also not an effective solution, because these organizations do not have the
resources necessary to care for the millions in need.244 As noted earlier, studies
reveal that the uninsured in this country in fact suffer a decline in health when
compared to those with insurance, and therefore, it is evident that they do not
receive adequate care. 245 Absent extensive governmental intervention to infuse
resources into the charitable care system, the system cannot be relied upon to
adequately serve the needs of the uninsured.
Second, several market flaws generate nonoptimal outcomes in the health
insurance market and justify governmental intervention to regulate the conduct of
health insurers. These are information imbalance, disparity of bargaining power,
and externalities.246
Insurers have exclusive control over the statistics and other information utilized
to classify risks. 24 7 Potential customers often have little information about health
risks and medical technology, and therefore, cannot judge how particular
240. Richard A. Epstein- Living Dangerously: A Defense of Mortal Peril, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REV. 909, 952.
241. Epstein, supra note 88, at 88.
242. Id.; Epstein, supra note 240, at 920.
243. See Epstein, supra note 88, at 88 (arguing that our heavily regulated and subsidized
system of medical care already cannot be considered market-driven and "is no more a
market than the systems of state provided care that are found in Canada and Europe .... ).
244. JOSEPH WHITE, COMPETING SOLUTIONS: AMERICAN HEALTH CARE PROPOSALS AND
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 53-54 (1995) ("Such [charity] hospitals ... have interns and
residents to do the work because of their relationships with a training program, but nowhere
near the resources of a freestanding university hospital.").
245. Baker et al., supra note 172, at 1108. The study, which involved 7577 individuals
between the ages of fifty-one and sixty-one found that "continuously uninsured participants
were 63 percent more likely than the privately insured participants to have a decline in their
overall health between 1992 and 1996 and 23 percent more likely to have a new physical
difficulty that affected walking or climbing stairs (i.e., a difficulty with mobility.)." Id.
These findings were consistent with conclusions from two previous, smaller studies. Id. See
also, Hadley, supra note 172.
246. ABRAHAM, supra note 25, at 32; GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 10-13.
247. ABRAHAM, supra note 25, at 32.
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248
exclusions or limitations might be harmful to them. For example, they might not
realize that a coverage exclusion for mammograms could significantly reduce the
likelihood of detecting a common disease at an early and easily curable stage.
249
Furthermore, health insurance policies can be very lengthy, and their language is
often complex, abstruse, and ambiguous. 250 The average American has
approximately an eighth-grade reading comprehension level. 251 Consumers,
therefore, are unlikely to thoroughly read lengthy and complicated documents and
are even less likely to understand the details of policy terms, including coverage
restrictions and exclusions.
Unequal bargaining power is also a basis for governmental intervention in the
insurance market. Insurers dictate and control the terms of insurance, and
customers have no opportunity to bargain over particular provisions that are
unfairly discriminatory. 252 They can either accept the package offered by the
insurer or turn to other providers, who may have similarly discriminatory terms.
For the 155 million Americans who obtain health insurance through employment,
there is even less choice.253 Their bargaining power is diminished by the fact that
they must accept whatever single plan is offered by their employer or, at best, can
select from among a very limited number of options that are provided. A recent
study by the American Medical Association found that "health insurance markets
are dominated by a few companies that have significant power over the
marketplace" and "significant leverage over patients and physicians in determining
the scope, coverage, and quality of health care in this country."254 Consumers are
therefore often significantly disadvantaged by bargaining power disparities.
248. MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS 43-44 (1997).
249. It should be noted that recently a controversy has developed concerning the value of
mammograms. Seven large studies that were conducted in the past were reanalyzed and
found to be severely flawed. Their conclusion that mammography saves lives is therefore
questioned, but most breast cancer specialists still urge women to undergo routine
mammograms. John Crewdson, Cancer Studies May Have Bias: Some Deaths Likely
Attributed to Other, Non-cancer Causes, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 2002, at 1; Tara Parker-Pope,
Women Are Still Urged to Get Mammograms Despite New Controversy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,
2002, at B 1; Craig Stoltz, The Mammogram Debate, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2002, at F7.
250. ABRAHAM, supra note 25, at 32.
251. See Terry C. Davis, et al., Reading Ability of Parents Compared with Reading Level
of Pediatric Patient Education Materials, 93 PEDIATRICS 460, 461-62 (1994); Stuart A.
Grossman et al., Are Informed Consent Forms That Describe Clinical Oncology Research
Protocols Readable By Most Patients and Their Families? 12 J. CLIN. ONCOL. 2211, 2212
(1994).
252. See ABRAHAM, supra note 25, at 33-34.
253. Fronstin and Helman, supra note 219, at 4. The survey found that "[e]mployment-
based health insurance is by far the most common form of health insurance coverage in the
United States." Id. Almost 100 million workers obtained such insurance, and, including their
dependents, approximately 155 million Americans under the age of sixty-five, or 65% of the
nonelderly population, were covered by employer-provided health benefits. Id.; Hyman &
Hall, supra note 218, at 23 (estimating that the number of Americans who have
employment-based health insurance is 177 million).
254. American Medical Association, Competition in Health Insurance: A Comprehensive
Study of U.S. Markets, (Executive Summary Nov. 2001), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/upload/mmf3 l/execsummary.doc (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
2003]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The insurance market is also characterized by externalities. 255 Externalities are
costs that fall on third parties rather than on the individual who generated the
expenses, and, therefore, they produce an inefficient use of resources. 256 The
problem of externalities resulting from deficient insurance coverage has high
societal and economic costs. People who have exhausted their AIDS caps or who
have severe psychiatric problems with no coverage for mental health care will
receive high-cost treatment through emergency rooms and will often require drastic
interventions.257 Had these individuals been able to obtain routine medical care in a
doctor's office at an earlier point, their conditions might have been treated through
inexpensive medication or other less costly means. Furthermore, people with
inadequate medical care because of insurance exclusions and limitations are likely
to be less productive members of society and might need public assistance in the
form of a variety of social services. 25 The cost of these treatments and services is
ultimately absorbed by taxpayers. Governmental intervention constraining insurers'
ability to exclude coverage for necessary services can reduce externalities and
diminish their adverse societal consequences.
C. A Centralized, Publicly Accountable Governmental Agency Could Be
Established to Regulate Health Care Coverage
A third option is the establishment of a centralized, publicly accountable entity
with regulatory powers over the health insurance industry. Many other industries
are already regulated by powerful administrative agencies. For example, the
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") regulates the aviation industry, 259 the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") regulates activities that affect the
environment, 26° and the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") regulates food and
drug products. 26' There is no reason why health insurance should not be subject to
similar governmental oversight.
1. Models for a Regulatory Agency
The idea of governmental regulation of health insurance coverage is not
revolutionary. The Medicare system already relies on the regulatory authority of
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS"), formerly the Health Care
Financing Administration ("HCFA"), 262 to make nationally binding coverage
decisions.263 The Social Security Act provides guidelines as to what services will
255. GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 12.
256. Id. at 10.
257. Blakely, supra note 8, at I ("Economists say these costs are picked up in various
ways: by businesses and their employees, in the form of higher premiums for their
insurance; by workers, in the form of taxes; and by all Americans, in the form of an
opportunity cost in lost value to the U.S. economy.").
258. See id. at 2-3.
259. 49 U.S.C. § 106 (1997).
260. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994) (Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, Section 1).
261. 21 U.S.C. § 393 (1999).
262. For discussion of the name change, see http://www.cms.gov/about/reorg.asp.
263. 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2) (1992).
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be covered by Medicare. 264 For example, generally, services must be "reasonable
and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the
functioning of a malformed body member." 265 Within these guidelines, CMS
makes national coverage decisions that grant, limit, or exclude Medicare coverage
for particular medical services, procedures, and devices. 266 One of CMS's
functions, therefore, is to serve as a regulatory agency that creates a Medicare
benefits package.
In addition, the establishment of a central regulatory agency was contemplated
in numerous health care reform proposals that were debated by the 103d Congress
during the Clinton era.267 The proposed independent federal agencies would have
had broad authority to institute nationally binding health insurance coverage
packages.268
The most well known of the bills was President Clinton's Health Security Act
("HSA"). 269 The HSA tried to achieve a compromise between a single-payer,
public insurance scheme, such as Canada's, and proposals that relied on managed
market forces with weak or nonexistent government intervention.270 Under the bill,
individuals would obtain health coverage through health alliances that would
negotiate favorable prices from competing qualified health plans. 271 Clinton's plan
required employers to provide insurance for all full-time and part-time employees
and their families but mandated that they pay at most eighty percent of the
premiums of basic plans, while employees would pay the remaining twenty
264. Id.. § 1395y.
265. Id. § 1395y(a)(l)(A).
266. 64 Fed. Reg. 22,619, 22,621 (Apr. 27, 1999). The agency initiates its review process
for making national coverage decisions when it internally identifies issues that should be
considered or when it receives a formal request for review of an issue. Id. The Medicare
system, however, has been criticized for the length of time it takes to approve new
technology for coverage. Jane Cys, Technology Approval Process Under Fire, AM. MED.
NEWS, Mar. 19, 2001, at 5, 5. In response, it created the Medicare Coverage Advisory
Commission in June 1999, consisting of nationally recognized experts whose input can
facilitate the decisionmaking process. Id. at 6.
Medicare also contracts with private insurance companies, known as carriers and
intermediaries, to process Medicare claims submitted by providers; and peer review
organizations ("PROs") review hospital services. 64 Fed. Reg. at 22,621; Diane F. Paulson,
Estate Planning for the Aging or Incapacitated Client in Massachusetts: Protecting Legal
Rights, Preserving Resources and Providing Health Care Options, Program Eligibility and
Coverage, Medicare, EPAIII MA-CLE 31-1 §§ 31.1.2 & 31.6.1(a) (1998). If no specific
national coverage decision addresses the service at issue, coverage decisions are left to the
discretion of the local contractors. 64 Fed. Reg. at 22,621.
267. Eleanor D. Kinney, Protecting Consumers and Providers Under Health Reform: An
Overview of the Major Administrative Law Issues, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 83, 84-85 (1995).
268. Id. at 123.
269. H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter HSA1.
270. DANIELS, supra note 15, at 157.
271. H.R. 3600 § 1202(b)(2). Regional alliances would be established by each state, and
corporate alliances would be established by employers with over 5000 employees who
choose to form alliances. Id. §§ 1201, 1311(b). States would also be permitted to create a
single payer system. Id. § 1221. If family members could obtain coverage through more than
one corporate alliance or a corporate alliance and a regional alliance, they would generally
be free to choose their preferred alliance. Id. § 1013.
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percent. 272 The self-employed would also purchase benefits through health
273
alliances, and government subsidies would assist the unemployed.
The HSA would have established the National Health Board, an executive
agency consisting of seven individuals appointed by the President for staggered
four-year terms. 274 The Board would formulate a comprehensive benefits package,
develop a national health care budget, and engage in quality assurance activities.
275
The statute would have outlawed discrimination or rate differentials based on age,
sex, and medical conditions, and health plans would have been required to enroll
all who wished to join them. 276 Clinton's plan, therefore, guaranteed universal
health coverage and a nationally mandated benefits package that would be
determined and regulated by a federal agency. It did not, however, establish a
national health care system by which all physicians would become employees of
the federal government.
By contrast, a bill sponsored by Representative McDermott and Senator
Wellstone, the American Health Security Act,277 called for the elimination not only
278of all private insurers but also of Medicare and Medicaid, replacing them with a
single, government-sponsored insurance plan financed through taxes. 279 Thus, the
money currently spent by federal and state governments and individuals on health
insurance and medical care would be rechanneled into the plan, known as a "single-
payer plan" because it would direct all funds to a single source that would pay for
health care.280 All services would be free at the point of delivery, and the plan
would approximate the Canadian health care system.
28 1
Like the HSA, the McDermott/Wellstone bill established an independent federal
entity with broad powers to institute policy and create a national benefits
program.282 The American Health Security Standards Board was to be composed of
the Secretary of Health and Human Services and six other presidentially appointed
28328individuals who would have authority to hire other staff members. 284 The
Board's duties would include developing policies, procedures, guidelines and
requirements concerning eligibility, enrollment, benefits, and coverage of particular
272. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF
TITLE VII OF H.R. 3600, S. 1757, AND S. 1775 ("HEALTH SECURITY ACT") 4 (Comm. Print
1993) [hereinafter Joint Committee]. Small businesses would receive subsidies for the cost
of employee benefits premiums through discounts in the cost of health plans. H.R. 3600 §
6123.
273. Joint Committee, supra note 272, at 5-6.
274. H.R. 3600 § 1501.
275. Id. § 1503. The Board would have the power to appoint an executive director and
hire additional officers and employees. Id. § 1505.
276 . THE WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, HEALTH SECURITY: THE
PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 33 (1993). See H.R. 3600 § 1402.
277. H.R. 1200, S. 491, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
278. Id. § 106.
279. Id. §§ 801, 811-14.
280. DANIELS ET AL., supra note 80, at 73.
281. Id.; H.R. 1200 § 201.
282. H.R. 1200 § 401.
283. Id. § 401(b)(1).
284. Id. § 4010).
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285services.
A third reform was a proposal sponsored by Representative Cooper and Senator
286Breaux, The Managed Competition Act of 1993. The bill's approach involved a
combination of market force regulation and voluntary participation.287 It proposed a
system of state and regional purchasing pools, 288 eliminated Medicaid 289 in favor of
a low-income assistance plan that would allow the poor to purchase private
insurance, 29 and reformed Medicare to slow expenditures.291 Like the other reform
proposals, the Cooper bill established a federal agency-the Health Care Standards
Commission, that was to design a standard benefits package.292
2. Procedures and Standards to Be Utilized by a Regulatory Agency
A regulatory agency could advance many of the principles of moral fairness
delineated in this Article. It could require insurers to cover at a minimum standard
preventive care and standard therapies that are medically necessary to cure or
alleviate the symptoms of mental or physical impairments that substantially limit
major life activities. The agency could also prohibit insurers from considering the
moral culpability of patients in making coverage decisions, a practice in which they
do not currently engage. The regulatory body is also more likely to be sensitive to
economic issues than are legislatures. 293 While legislative mandates might be
passed without sufficient consideration of the overall cost of all coverage
requirements,294 a federal agency would focus on the global cost of the benefits
package it designs and would ideally create coverage requirements in light of both
patient needs and the reality of finite resources.
29 5
Furthermore, the agency could promote the value of participatory
decisionmaking by establishing processes that include input from all stakeholders
in the health care field, including patients, doctors, researchers, research sponsors,
and insurers. Implementing appropriate procedures and standards for the regulatory
process, however, is a significant challenge. While a participatory policymaking
285. Id. § 401(0.
286. H.R. 3222, S. 1579, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
287. DANIELS ET AL., supra note 80, at 72.
288. H.R. 3222 § 1101.
289. Id. § 2301.
290. Id. §§ 2001-2004.
291. Id. §§ 2201-2208.
292. Managed Competition Act of 1993, H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., and S. 1579,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) at §§ 13011313.
293. See Butler, supra note 176, at 115 (discussing the 1,000 state mandates that have
been passed, in part as a result of special interest lobbying efforts). Goodman estimates one-
quarter of persons currently uninsured could afford basic no-frills health insurance if some
or all of these state mandates were repealed. Id. (citing JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L.
MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER 47 (1992)).
294. Stone, Managed Care, supra note 89, at 1215 ("it doesn't cost a nickel to pass
legislation prohibiting managed care plans from doing this or that or to declare high-
sounding rights for consumers."). See also supra Part V.A.
295. If a public health care system were adopted, Congress would establish a set budget
for the program each year. See discussion of the option of nationalizing health care, infra
Part V.D. 1.
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process is important to the promotion of moral fairness, it also can create several
problems that must be considered. These include paralysis of the system due to
excessive debate, discrimination against patients with unpopular illnesses, and
excessive influence of particular interest groups.
Determining the degree to which the public should participate in health care
regulation is particularly difficult. A system of open, community-based
deliberations concerning benefits criteria can lead to thoughtful decisions that are
embraced by the public because outcomes are commonly chosen and understood.296
Some argue, however, that the public should not participate in making "tragic
choices," that is, painful rationing decisions that involve limiting life-enhancing or
life-extending treatments. 297 According to this argument, the social cost of
challenging fundamental values, such as the sanctity of life, in a public way is too
high, and therefore such necessary but controversial decisions should be hidden
from the public or disguised.298
Indeed, extensive public debate concerning every coverage decision could
significantly slow or paralyze the system. The agency would need the flexibility to
adjust its coverage mandates quickly in light of emerging research data concerning
the effectiveness of various therapies, new technology, and other factors that might
influence treatment priorities. When a new drug, device, or procedure becomes
available, it should promptly be considered by the agency to determine whether it
should be included in the mandatory benefits package. Unlimited public discussion
could delay public access to advanced therapies and cost lives.
Ironically, too much reliance on customer preference can also introduce new
forms of discrimination into the health care system, resulting either from public
ignorance or prejudice. The experience of Oregon's Medicaid reform is
illuminating in this regard. In the early 1990s, Oregon decided to increase the
number of its Medicaid enrollees by limiting the medical procedures it covered so
that reimbursement could be obtained only for the services that were of most
benefit to patients. 299 Oregon ranked over 700 condition-treatment pairs (such as
appendicitis and surgery to remove the appendix) according to the degree of
medical benefit produced by the therapy that was intended to alleviate the
ailment. 300 Actuaries determined how much each treatment would cost and
estimated the number of people who would enroll in the program.30 1 The state's.
legislature then decided where the line would be drawn, that is, how many of the
ranked services Medicaid would cover during the next budget cycle.0 2 To form its
ranking list, Oregon first utilized a strict cost effectiveness evaluation, but it was
harshly criticized for doing so.3 3 In a second endeavor, it combined effectiveness
ratings with consumer preferences for quality-of-life factors, but it was then
296. DANIELS ET AL., supra note 80, at 57; HALL, supra note 248, at 92; Fleck, supra note
200, at 1598.
297. GuIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES 17-19 (1978).
298. Id. at 53-64; DANIELS ET AL., supra note 80, at 58.
299. HALL, supra note 248, at 75-76.
300. Id. at 76.
301. Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Oregon Medicaid Program: Is It Just?, 1 HEALTH
MATRIX 175, 176-77 (1991).
302. Id. at 177. Oregon is on a two-year budget cycle.
303. HALL, supra note 248, at 76.
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criticized for creating a ranking that involved disability discrimination because of
biased public perception concerning the quality of life of those with certain
disabilities. 34 Finally, in a third ranking, Oregon eliminated consideration of
quality of life and focused almost solely on medical effectiveness.
To obtain public input, Oregon held approximately forty-seven forums with
over 1000 participants and conducted random telephone surveys of 1000 Oregon
residents. 30 5 In light of the public's expressed preferences, the first draft listed
inexpensive office visits for thumb sucking and tooth capping much higher than
high-cost, life-saving procedures such as surgery for appendicitis and ectopic
pregnancy. The second draft, emphasizing quality of life, listed "burn over large
areas of the body" as equivalent to "upset stomach." Many of these flaws were
ultimately corrected in the final, enacted list, but only because some public choices
306
were ignored or overruled by bureaucrats.
A public agency that is established to regulate health care coverage should
obtain public input, but not through random polling of people who might often
express uneducated or biased opinions. Leonard Fleck suggests a model of public
deliberations that he calls the "informed democratic consensus model. ' 30 7 He
envisions a system in which fifty citizen/patients constitute a "district health
council" in each congressional district.0 8 Each district health council would elect a
member to serve in a "national health congress." 30 9 Every district would reach a
local consensus, and its representative would participate in national meetings,
explaining and advancing the local council's views.310 Ultimately, according to
Fleck, a national consensus would emerge as to the specifics of health care
coverage.311
Fleck's model could be utilized to construct a system of local bodies and
national representatives that would participate in the deliberations of a future
federal regulatory agency. Local offices of the national administrative agency could
facilitate the establishment of district councils in their locales and could recruit
members through advertisements and personal contact with various organizations.
District councils could periodically send reports with their recommendations to the
national headquarters. In the alternative, meetings with headquarters personnel
could be periodically scheduled, to be attended by a representative from each of the
district councils. If a public health care system were adopted,31 2 Congress would
304. Id.
305. Fleck, supra note 200, at 1628. See also Daniel M. Fox & Howard M. Leichter,
Rationing Care in Oregon: The New Accountability, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at 7, 21.
According to the authors, almost 70% of attendees at the forums were health care
professionals, and therefore they did not represent a broad cross-section of the public. Id.
306. HALL, supra note 248, at 93.
307. Fleck, supra note 200, at 1617.
308 . Id. at 1624. According to Fleck, health service providers should be denied
membership in the councils, though their expert advice could be sought.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1624-25.
311. Id. at 1625. Fleck acknowledges that these councils might have to discuss thousands
of diseases and thousands of therapeutic options. He believes the task is manageable,
however, because "there would be a very large core of health services for which we would
have a very high degree of consensus that the value of the services was worth the costs." Id.
312. See discussion infra Part V.D.l.
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determine its national budget, and citizens would be involved in the budgetary
process through the traditional means of lobbying and communication with their
representatives. The district councils could then participate in deliberations
concerning how much money is to be allocated by the administrative agency to
different geographic areas and what services are to be included in the national
benefits package.
This model, however, raises the potential problems of public choice and special
interest group influence. The concern of public choice theorists is that "political
decision-makers behave just like consumers and businesses-they attempt to
maximize their own self interest."313 Accordingly, a system that is open to public
influence is likely to be exploited by interest groups and lobbyists that are seeking
special favors and private profit.314 The philosopher John Rawls expressed a related
concern when he urged that policy decisions be made behind a veil of ignorance.
315
If an informed democratic consensus model were established, those most interested
in serving on the district health councils would be physicians and other health
professionals. These individuals would have an interest in ensuring that their
services are included in a national coverage mandate and, therefore, large numbers
of them would wish to serve on the councils.316 Not surprisingly, the majority of
attendees at the forums held in Oregon in conjunction with the state's Medicaid
reform were health care professionals. Even if they do not directly serve on the
district health councils, special interest representatives might overwhelm council
members with their lobbying efforts, much as they currently lobby legislatures for
specific legislative mandates:8 In the words of one commentator: "two phenomena
work to imbalance political arenas: unequal interests and disproportionate
resources. The two are interrelated-groups with more at stake will invest more to
secure an outcome."' 319 The public choice problem would need -to be openly
recognized. Safeguards would have to be implemented to ensure diverse
representation on district health councils and to establish resistance to undue
313. Butler, supra note 176, at 114; see also DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 1
(1989) ("Public choice can be defined as the economic study of nonmarket decision making,
or simply the application of economics to political science.").
314. Butler, supra note 176, at 114. Political activity by those wishing to gain special
favors is known as "rent-seeking."
315. RAWLS, supra note 146, at 118. See discussion supra Part III.E.
316. Butler, supra note 176, at 116 ("For example, chiropractors, optometrists, dentists,
podiatrists, and allergists should be willing to invest substantial sums to make sure that their
services are covered as part of the [National Benefits] Package."). If council members were
to be popularly elected, these medical professionals would be willing to invest significant
money and time in campaigning for council positions. In the alternative, if members were
appointed by some central authority, the individuals would likely aggressively lobby those in
charge of the appointment process in order to gain positions on the councils.
317. Fleck, supra note 200, at 1628 (citing Fox & Leichter, supra note 305, at 21).
318. See Butler, supra note 176, at 116.
319. James Morone & Theodore R. Marmor, Representing Consumer Interests: The Case
of American Health Planning, CrTZENS AND HEALTH CARE 25, 41-42 (Barry Checkoway ed.,
1981). The chapter critiques the concept of Health Systems Agencies ("HSAs"), a network
of planning bodies that were to be established under the National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 1974 and were to be dominated by consumers. The
difficulties of achieving meaningful consumer representation are discussed in detail.
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influence by individual interest groups.
For example, the councils could be composed of unpaid volunteers3 20 who
would be recruited by the regulatory agency from among each of the stakeholder
groups: patients, doctors, researchers, research sponsors, and insurers, with a set
number of representatives from each group.32 The councils could include an equal
number of members from each stakeholder group, or to minimize the likelihood
that patients, as lay people, would be intimidated by the medical professionals,
patients could be allowed a larger membership than other stakeholders. In addition,
members could be recruited from specific organizations or advocacy groups so that
diverse opinions are represented and different interests are balanced against each
322other.
One additional issue should be addressed. The existence of a federal agency that
develops a national benefits package will not eliminate all coverage disputes. While
the regulatory entity could establish national coverage mandates, administrators
will have to make individual benefit decisions that are consistent with the federal
guidelines. Administrators will still have discretion to determine, for example,
whether a specific therapy is medically necessary in a particular instance.
Consequently, disagreements will still arise and the public will continue to need
mechanisms by which to challenge unfavorable coverage decisions and resolve
disputes. This can be accomplished through independent review boards.3 23 Already,
at least thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have laws that allow
patients to request independent reviews of adverse reimbursement
determinations, 324 and some have advocated the inclusion of an independent review
320. I would not support the selection of council members through popular elections
because those without significant financial means would be unlikely to run successful
campaigns. In addition, patients who are battling illness and who might have valuable input
and insights as representatives on local councils would not have the energy and stamina to
campaign for positions. Election results are often determined by the amount of money spent
on media exposure or by the support of a powerful politician rather than the merit of the
candidate. In addition, voter apathy and low turnouts at the polls often mean that only
members of particular interest groups actually vote in local elections so that those elected do
not necessarily have a popular mandate. Morone & Marmor, supra note 319, at 44-45 ("In
practice, electoral apathy of most consumers undermines direct elections as the mechanism
of accountability to consumer constituencies.").
321. In Ontario, Canada, the Ministry of Health established a system of District Health
Councils with authority to assist in overseeing the health services of their regions. They are
composed of volunteers and professional staff. John D. Blum, Universality, Quality &
Economics: Finding A Balance in Ontario and British Columbia, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 203,
211-12 (1994) (citing District Health Councils: Partners in Health Planning, ONTARIO
MINITsmY OF HEALTH NEWS RELEASE (Ontario Ministry of Health, Toronto, Ont., Can.), Oct.
1989).
322. See Morone & Marmor, supra note 319, at 43-45 ("Representatives from these
groups will have clearly defined constituencies, experience in organizational politics, and
resources at their disposal. These attributes will help them both in identifying group interests
and in pursuing them, regardless of their other characteristics").
323. See Hoffman, supra note 202, at 260-63 and 270-73 for a discussion of a proposed
independent review process.
324. Tom Ramstack, Lawsuits Few So Far in States with Patients' Bill of Rights,
Officials Say, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, 2001 WL 24477730 (July 11, 2001). The
article reports that the states generally utilize an independent review organization of experts
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process in whatever Patients' Bill of Rights legislation is ultimately passed by
Congress. 325 Medicare likewise provides mechanisms for review and
reconsideration of disputed determinations.
26
D. The Establishment of a Regulatory Agency Could Be Accompanied by a
Universal Coverage Mandate
As discussed above, a federal regulatory agency could advance many of the
principles of moral fairness by developing a national benefits package and a
participatory decisionmaking process. However, it would not necessarily promote
universality. National requirements concerning what services are to be covered by
insurers will not assist the millions of Americans who have no insurance. To
achieve universality, we would have to establish a universal coverage mandate.
Universal coverage is the most controversial of the proposals analyzed in this
Article. Several potential ways of establishing a universal coverage system are
discussed in this part along with their advantages, disadvantages, and implications.
1. Designing a Universal Coverage System
Universal coverage can be implemented through a variety of mechanisms. First,
the government can establish a national health care system with public insurance,
by which the government pays for medical services, employs the health care
providers, and owns all hospitals and medical facilities. 27 In the alternative, the
government can provide health coverage for the public while exercising less
328control over providers and delivery systems. Doctors, therefore, could work as
independent contractors for the government, as is done in Canada and Denmark,329
and hospitals could be private nonprofits or religiously affiliated.33 °
who decide the claim at issue within fifteen to thirty days or twenty-four to seventy-two
hours for urgent cases. Many commentators favor establishment of these boards because
they resolve disputes without litigation and thus prevent insurers from incurring legal costs
that would ultimately be passed on to consumers. See also Supreme Court's 2001-2002 Term
May Be Eventful for HMOs, Health Law, 10 HEALTH LAW REP. 1473, 1473 (Sept. 27, 2001)
(stating that "some 37 states and the District of Columbia... require independent review of
HMO decisions.").
325. See Tom Ramstack, Patients' Rights Lawsuits Few So Far: States Using Review
Boards to Setttle Case Against HMOs, WASH. TIMES, July 11, 2001, at B6; Transcript of Ari
Fleischer's June 27 Daily Press Briefing, U.S. NEWSWIRE, 2001 WL 21895343, June 27,
2001; Timothy Pajak, Gore for President: Is It Good for HR?, HR WIRE, September 4, 2000.
326. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.801-877 (2000).
327. Hampton, supra note 174, at 1026 (indicating that "[slome countries have opted for
pure socialized medicine."); Timothy S. Jost, Private or Public Approaches to Insuring the
Uninsured: Lessons from International Experience with Private Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 419, 436 (2001) (discussing tax-based insurance programs, Sweden's health care
program that provides services through the employment of salaried professionals, and other
national health care programs).
328. Hampton, supra note 174, at 1027.
329. Jost, supra note 327, at 436.
330. Id. This is the case in the Netherlands.
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A "mandatory private insurance" system can also be utilized.331 Under such a
scheme, all individuals are required to obtain health insurance, just as they are
obligated to purchase auto insurance, and the insurance industry is extensively
regulated by the government. Insurers are prohibited from denying coverage to any
eligible individual; the government dictates the premiums that insurers can charge
and the benefits they must cover; and individual risk underwriting is disallowed.332
Finally, the existing private insurance system could remain intact, and Medicaid
programs could be expanded to cover all those who are otherwise uninsured.
Vermont, for example, has moved close to this approach. The state enhanced its
Medicaid program for children so that only 4% of children are without health
insurance, and it allows adults in families whose incomes are less than 150% of the
poverty line to purchase Medicaid coverage for small payments. 333 In 2002
Vermont's overall uninsured rate was just eight percent. 334
Universal health care can be funded through general taxes, as are many other
federal programs. 335 Alternatively, coverage for members of the workforce and
their dependents can be funded by payroll taxes paid either by employees or by
employers.336 Under this system, workers would be required to purchase insurance,
whether it be public insurance or mandatory private insurance. Individuals who are
unemployed can receive public subsidies or be placed in a separate, Medicaid-type
system. 337 A third option was delineated in the Clinton plan, which would have
avoided a tax-based system by requiring employers to pay eighty percent of the
cost of insurance for all full-time and part-time employees. 338 GovernmentS339
subsidies would have assisted the unemployed.
Universal health care can be a potent tool for promoting moral fairness in health
coverage. It would eliminate the large segment of the American population that is
currently uninsured and suffers from deteriorating health due to medical neglect.34 °
It would eliminate externalities associated with the provision of medical care in
emergency rooms and clinics to those who could afford insurance but choose not to
331. Hampton, supra note 174, at 1028.
332. Id. at 1029 (Switzerland has implemented "a system of tightly regulated mandatory
private health insurance"); see also Jost, supra note 327, at 479-80 (discussing the effects of
unregulated private insurance on high-risk individuals and the necessary checks or
limitations placed on insurance providers to guarantee access to insurance).
333. Jonathan Cohn, Invisible Man, NEw REPUBLIC, July 1, 2002, available at
http://www.tnr.com.
334. Id.
335. Jost, supra note 327, at 435-36 (explaining that general tax-based insurance
programs exist in England, the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and many
developing nations. In addition, the Medicaid program in the U.S. is essentially such a
system).
336. Id. at 434-35.
337. Id. at 436-37.
338. Joint Committee on Taxation, Description and Analysis of Title VII of H.R. 3600,
S. 1757 ("Health Security Act") (JC-20-93), Dec. 20, 1993, at 4; HSA, H.R. 3600, S. 1757,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) § 6123 See supra Part V.C.1 for further discussion of the
Clinton plan.
339. Joint Committee, supra note 272, at 5-6.
340. See Cutler, supra note 177, at 20; Baker et al., supra note 172, at 1108 (reporting on
a study that found that lack of health benefits is associated with adverse health outcomes.).
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purchase it.341 It may also diminish incentives for some to remain on welfare rather
than work in order to receive Medicaid benefits.342
Universal coverage, however, has significant potential drawbacks. If employers
are required to provide insurance to their employees, some might reduce their
workforces to diminish health benefit costs or eliminate pensions and reduce
salaries to offset higher benefit expenses. Nevertheless, the need to remain
competitive in the market, to maintain a profitable level of productivity, and to
attract highly qualified workers, might dissuade employers from shrinking their
workforces or taking other steps that will be unappealing to employees.
If universal coverage is publicly supported, it will require substantial federal
spending, which would have to be financed through taxes or cuts in other
programs. 34 International experience, however, provides some encouraging
indications concerning the cost of universal coverage. The cost of administering
public health systems can be relatively low because funds are collected through
taxes and paid directly to providers for services rendered. 344 Furthermore, many of
the expenses absorbed by private insurers are avoided by a public system, including
marketing costs, underwriting costs, and commission payments for insurance
policy sales.
345
Scholars have noted that countries with universal coverage uniformly spend a
smaller percentage of their GNPs on health care than does the U.S. 346 In addition,
the United States has far less success in controlling health, care costs than do other
nations. 4 Scholars have argued that in the American health care system, an
341. See Cutler, supra note 177, at 20. The author describes this as the "free-rider"
problem..
342. Id. at 20. According to the author, "[e]mpirical estimates suggest that up to one-
quarter of the approximately 4 million welfare recipients would enter the labor force if
health insurance were available continuously." Id.
343. See id. at 24; Butler, supra note 176, at 116-17.
344. Jost, supra note 327, at 426.
345. Id. at 427. The author notes that commissions for initial sales are often ten to twenty
percent and are set at five percent for renewals. See also Light, supra note 174, at 16
("Private health insurance is much more costly and inefficient than universal health
insurance.").
346. Stephen Heffler et al., Health Spending Growth Up in 1999; Faster Growth
Expected in the Future, HEALTH AFFAIRS, March-April 2001, at 193, 193 (noting that health
care spending grew just 4.8% in 1998 but was up 5.6% in 1999 and projecting an "average
annual growth rate of 7.2 percent for 1998-2010," so that health spending will account for
15.9% of GDP by 2010); Jason B. Saunders, Note, International Health Care: Will the
United States Ever Adopt Health Care for All?-A Comparison Between Proposed United
States Approaches to Health Care and the Single-Source Financing. Systems of Denmark and
The Netherlands, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 711, 733 (1995) (stating that "[u]nder
the current health care system in the United States, health care expenditure is the highest in
the world." Further, according to the article, "[als a percent of GNP in U.S. dollars, the
United States leads the world in cost of health care at 11.2% versus 6% in Denmark (the
lowest percent). Id. at 733 n.86. See also Jost, supra note 188, at 4-5 (noting that in 1996 the
U.S. spent 14.2% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health care, or $3708 per
individual, while "Germany spent 10.5% of GDP, $2222 per person; Canada, 9.2% of GDP,
$2002 per person; Japan, 7.2% of GDP, $1581 per person; and the U.K., 6.9% of GDP,
$1304 per person.")
347. Hampton, supra note 174, at 1031-32, n.202 (citing George Schieber, Health
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"excess administrative apparatus" accounts for ten percent of spending, 348 that
compared with Canada's national health program, the U.S. system is inefficient
because of its administrative structure, 349 and that the administrative costs of
hospitals in the United States are more than double the costs of those in Canada.3
In the words of one commentator:
[W]e generally see that private insurance programs pay more for services-not
less-than public programs. When we leave the nirvana of economic models
and return to the real world, the superiority of private to public systems seems
much less clear cut; indeed, public programs may come out on top.
351
In order to control universal health care costs, the federal government could
follow a model established by other countries with universal health care. 352 The
regulatory agency could negotiate fee schedules with a collective organization that
represents the physicians in a particular region.353 In addition, a national or regional
budgetary cap could be set to limit overall expenditures for physician services,
based on historical cost information and political realities.354 If physicians exceed
the expenditure cap, they would suffer a reduction in the following year's national
or regional fee schedule, and thus doctors would have an incentive to police each
other to ensure professionalism and cost containment.5 5 This system may not be a
radical departure from physicians' current practice environment. Under managed
care, doctors have already become accustomed to operating under significant
administrative constraints and to considering the financial implications of their
Spending Deliver, and Outcomes in OECD Countries Data Watch, HEALTH AFF., Summer
1993, at 120, 125):
Excess health care inflation is a far more serious problem in the United States
than in other countries .... [B]etween 1985 and 1991 U.S. nominal per capita
health spending each year increased 70% faster than nominal per capita
GDP... compared with only 35%.in Canada, 19% in France, 13% in the
United Kingdom and 10% in Japan.
348. David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Cost Without Benefit: Administrative
Waste in U.S. Health Care, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 441,443 (1986).
349. David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, The Deteriorating Administrative
Efficiency of the U.S. Health Care System, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1253, 1253 (1991); Jost,
supra note 188, at 7 ("In 1987, health care administrative costs in the United States
amounted to between 19.3 and 24.1% of total costs, compared to between 8.4% and 11.1%
in Canada.").
350. David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Administrative Costs in U.S.
Hospitals, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 400, 400 (1993).
351. Jost, supra note 327, at 431-32 (footnote omitted). See also Steffie Woolhandler and
David U. Himmelstein, Paying for National Health Insurance-And Not Getting It, HEALTH
AFF., Summer 2002, at 88, 88-96 (arguing that tax-funded health spending in the United
States is currently higher than it is in every nation other than Switzerland and that national
health insurance would, in reality, require smaller tax increases than popularly assumed).
352. Hampton, supra note 174, at 1034-35.
353. Id. The regions could be statewide or could be divisions within the states so that
some differentiation is made between urban and rural areas.
354. Id. at 1036.
355. Id. at 1036-37.
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treatment decisions.3 56
Nevertheless, while fixed fees and budgetary caps might be necessary, they
introduce their own complexities and problems. One commentator warns that
excessive price controls will lead to the following: "quantity demanded will either
be too high or price will be held down so that quantity supplied will be too low. In
either case, some insureds will have to go without care." 357 Universal health
coverage might therefore cause the average quality of the health care received by
current insureds to diminish because limited resources will have to be distributed
among many more people than are now consistently served by the system. For
example, patients might have to endure longer waiting periods, have fewer services
covered, and be restricted in their choice of physicians. 358 A recent survey of
individuals who are insured through their employers revealed that eighty-eight
percent of respondents were extremely satisfied, very satisfied, or at least
somewhat satisfied with their health plans. 359 The development of a national
benefits package that extends basic coverage to all Americans might reduce this
level of satisfaction because those who are accustomed to extensive coverage might
be reimbursed for fewer services under the basic national plan. Several mechanisms
for addressing these concerns are available and are analyzed in the following part.
2. Opt-out Provisions and Supplemental Coverage
One possibility is to establish a public insurance system but allow individuals to
opt out and purchase private insurance if they can afford to do so. 360 In Germany,
for example, people with an annual income of less than 6450 DM ($3200) are
required to enroll in the social insurance program, but all others can choose
whether to obtain social health insurance or private health insurance. 361 Similarly,
in Chile, all individuals are subject to a tax of seven percent of their wages with
which they are required to purchase health insurance, but they can choose to obtain
either social insurance coverage or a private health plan.3 62
Many individuals might find an opt-out provision appealing. With private
insurance, they could enjoy shorter waiting periods for appointments, choose their
own doctors, and have access to specialists who are not routinely available to those
356. See Stone, Doctor As Businessman, supra note 89 at 545-51 (discussing the
evolution of the doctor as a person who could not consider economics in decisions to the
current trend of having doctors considering cost in their decisions); Rothstein & Hoffman,
supra note 21, at 857 (discussing the common use of primary care physicians and the
resulting consideration of cost in determining whether another doctor with more expertise
should be considered in a particular situation).
357. Butler, supra note 176, at 118.
358. But see WHITE, supra note 244, at 139-40 ("Because choice of physician is clearly
greater in Canada than in America, the charge that universal coverage and cost control must
reduce Americans' choices is evidently false.").
359. Satisfaction with Health Care and Health Plans, EBRI Online, available at
http://www.ebri.org/hcs/200l/sat.fs.pdf (last visited Nov. .23, 2002). Of the respondents,
11% indicated that they were extremely satisfied, 41% were very satisfied, and 36% were
somewhat satisfied with their health plans.
360. Jost, supra note 327, at 439.
361. Id.
362. Id.
[Vol. 78:659
UNMANAGED CARE: TOWARDS MORAL FAIRNESS
utilizing the national health care system. In addition, private insurance could serve
as a partial antidote to the moral hazard problem. If copayments are charged for
services, people with private insurance are less likely to seek unnecessary
treatment.
The existence of a parallel private insurance system, however, could threaten the
integrity of the public insurance system.3 63 If the public system is tax-funded, and
every worker must contribute a certain percentage of her wages, the system's
survival would depend upon the participation of high earners. If wealthy Americans
are allowed to opt 'out, the system might be forced to operate on a shoe-string
budget, based on minimal tax revenues collected from the poor and governmental
subsidies. Similarly, if people of means can choose to purchase private insurance,
they will not be personally invested in supporting the public health system. Without
the political support of individuals who make large campaign contributions, have
lobbying power, and enjoy access to the media, the public health system is unlikely
to thrive.3 4 In addition, a parallel private insurance system might induce providers
to generate artificial shortages and waiting lists in the public health system in order
to encourage individuals to switch to the private system, in which providers can
charge higher prices.365
Some of these potential problems, however, could be combated through
regulatory measures. Germany, for example, has established several incentives for
joining its "sickness funds," as a result of which only ten percent of the population
has opted to purchase private insurance. 366 German insurers charge different
premiums to individuals of different ages, so that persons who purchase insurance
at a young age pay lower prices than purchasers of a more advanced age who are
more likely to become ill in the near future. 67 Individuals who wait to purchase
private insurance at an age at which they are more likely to require extensive
medical treatment are charged relatively high premiums, but young purchasers pay
premium prices that exceed the cost of services that they are likely to utilize at that
age. 368 These costs make private insurance unappealing to many consumers. In
addition, those who opt out of the sickness fund system by purchasing private
insurance generally cannot opt back in.369 Consequently, they must continue to pay
the high cost of private insurance even if they later decide that the money is not
363. A similar debate about parallel. coverage systems was generated by the KYL
Amendment, which was enacted as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and permits
Medicare patients to enter into private contracts with physicians in limited circumstances. 42
U.S.C. § 1395a (Supp. 2001). Opponents of the provision criticized it for undermining the
universalistic and equality-oriented principles of Medicare. Others supported the amendment
as enhancing individual freedom but criticized the limitations it placed on private
contracting. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Introduction: KYL Amendment Symposium, 10 HEALTH
MATRIX 1, 1 (2000); see also Thomas W. Greeson & Heather L. Gunas, Section 4507 and
the Importance of Private Contracts, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 35, 35 (2000) (discussing the
controversy surrounding the ability of medicare patients to enter into private contracts for
healthcare services).
364. Jost, supra note 327, at 491.
365. Id.
366. WHITE, supra note 244, at 75.
367. Id. at 77.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 78.
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well spent. Finally, legislation could render it unlawful for doctors to create
artificial shortages in the public system, and aggressive prosecution of violators
could serve as a deterrent for such conduct.
A second option would be to allow people to choose to remain uninsured and
avoid the cost of private insurance or receive a tax refund if the system is publicly
funded. This option, however, might result in adverse selection and externalities.
370
Those who would choose to be uninsured would likely be the healthiest individuals
who need few, if any, services. It is these individuals who subsidize expenditures
for the very sick. If healthy individuals are allowed to opt out of the insurance
system, the system's expenditures may exceed its revenues from taxes or premium
payments. Consequently, taxes or premium prices would have to be raised, and the
system could become unaffordable.
Furthermore, in reality, it is unlikely that uninsured individuals will be bound by
their choice to opt out of the system to the extent that they would be refused care
when they suffer catastrophic illness or injury. Today, we treat the uninsured (albeit
inadequately) in emergency rooms and public clinics. It is likely that we would
continue to provide limited care to the uninsured under a reformed system and
would not require the sick to endure terrible suffering without any medical
attention whatsoever even if they were uninsured solely because they had chosen to
opt out of the universal coverage system. These individuals would therefore
contribute no money to the health care budget but would receive treatment at public
cost, thus generating externalities.
A separate question relates to whether individuals who are enrolled in the public
system should have the option of purchasing private insurance to supplement the
services they receive through the national benefits package. 371 Private insurance
supplementation is available in many countries with tax-based insurance
programs. 372 In Canada, for example, almost fifteen million individuals have
private health insurance to cover hearing aids, vision and dental care, private
hospital rooms, prescription drugs, and chiropractors, which are not covered by the
public system. 373 In the United States, Medigap policies are available to
supplement Medicare coverage for the elderly. 374 Pursuant to the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 ("OBRA-90"), 7 private insurers may sell ten
standardized policies to Medicare enrollees, identified by the letters A through j.
376
370. See supra Parts I.B.1 and V.B for explanations of the terms "adverse selection" and
"externalities," respectively.
371. The Clinton plan, for example, would have allowed individuals to purchase
supplemental health insurance that would cover services not included in the national benefits
package. Joint Committee, supra note 272, at 2.
372. Jost, supra note 327, at 439-40. In some countries, private insurance covers products
and services not included in the public insurance package. In the United Kingdom and
Australia private insurance is purchased by those who are fully insured under the public
system as double coverage, to assure "prompter or more convenient access to health care,
more control over choice of provider, or access to better quality health care." Id. at 440.
373. Id. at 468-69.
374. PETER D. Fox ET AL., Medigap Regulation: Lessons for Health Care Reform, 20 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 31, 31-32 (1995).
375. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. 2001).
376. Id. The comprehensiveness of supplementation increases from policies A to J, with
high end policies paying for preventive care, at-home recovery, and prescription drugs.
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The availability of supplemental plans in the non-Medicare market would allow
insurers to continue to compete and profit in the marketplace despite extensive
regulation with respect to the basic benefits package. Supplemental plans may also
benefit medical researchers because some newly developed treatments or even
experimental therapies could be covered by these plans while they are excluded
from the national benefits package.
The idea of supplemental coverage, however, is also vulnerable to criticism.
First, the supplemental coverage market might be characterized by adverse
selection, wherein only those who actually need extra services purchase the
plans.377 Supplemental coverage plans might, therefore, be faced with very high
expenditures requiring frequent increases in premium prices and might ultimately
become unaffordable. The existence of supplemental coverage might also cause
policy-makers to be less conscientious about decisions concerning the basic benefit
package, since they would be assured that services not covered in the basic plan
would become available through supplemental policies. 378 Finally, supplemental
coverage might be perceived by some as being morally unfair and as undermining
the value of universality. One could object that it is unjust to allow wealthier
patients who have supplemental plans to receive treatments that are not available to
those of lesser means who have only the basic benefits package. On the other hand,
absolute equality may well be an unrealistic and inappropriate goal.379 In the words
of the scholar Charles Fried, "as long as our society considers that inequalities of
wealth and income are morally acceptable ... it is anomalous to carve out a sector
like health care and say that there equality must reign. ,380 Whether moral fairness
demands absolute equality is a subject for further debate.
Constructing an optimal system for the implementation of universal coverage is
beyond the scope of this Article. The idea of universal coverage will generate
passionate opposition and raises very significant policy problems. One scholar
reminds us, however, that those who oppose change, such as the limitations created
by managed care, are generally those who are privileged under the status quo. He
states:
all the parties to the controversy over managed care are the "haves"-the
insured population that worries about denial of beneficial care, the payers who
Lauren A. McCormack et al., Medigap Reform Legislation of 1990: Have the Objectives
Been Met? 18 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 157, 159-60 (1996).
377. Peter A. Diamond, Two Improvements on the Clinton Framework, 8 J. EcON. PERSP.
61, 66 (1994).
378. See id. (discussing the difficulty of "drawing lines between basic and supplementary
coverage").
379. See WHITE, supra note 244, at 140 (stating that those in rural areas receive inferior
care when compared to those in urban areas and that "[i]n all systems, those who are more
aggressive, charming, or able to communicate with doctors and medical staff have a better
chance of getting explanations or choices or attention."); Ezekiel Emanuel, Health Care
Reform: Still Possible, HASTINGS CENTER REP., March-April 2002, at 32, 33 ("Justice does
not require that every person receive the same health care services").
380. Charles Fried, Equality and Rights in Medical Care, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT,
February 1976, at 29, 32. (arguing that "[t]o say there is a right to health care does not imply
a right to equal access, a right that whatever is available to any shall be available to all."). Id.
at 29.
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want to control costs, and the providers who fear losing their professional
autonomy and forfeiting patient trust. Conspicuously absent from this triad are
the millions of uninsured. 81
A health care system that strives to promote moral fairness cannot continue to turn
an indifferent shoulder towards the uninsured.
VI. CONCLUSION
The American public has already demonstrated that it is concerned about moral
fairness in health insurance coverage. Numerous polls and surveys reveal that a
majority of the population believes that all Americans should have a right to
adequate health care. 38 2 Federal and state statutes have taken important steps to
address the problem of unfair discrimination in health insurance. However,
legislative mandates are inadequate as safeguards of moral fairness because of their
limited reach, significant loopholes, and piecemeal approach. We still have over
forty-two million Americans uninsured, as well as AIDS caps, exclusions or
limitations of coverage for mental health care, and refusals to reimburse for hearing
aids, among many other discriminatory benefit terms.
This Article has analyzed the concept of moral fairness and has developed
principles of moral fairness that should guide policymakers. It has also explored a
variety of mechanisms for the promotion of moral fairness in the realm of health
insurance. All mechanisms raise significant concerns and would require
consideration of substantial trade-offs. The issue of just distribution of health care
coverage is as complex as it is important, and no perfect resolution can be
developed for it.
In the 1990s, many reforms were contemplated, though none were ultimately
passed. American society still might not be prepared to expend the financial and
human resources necessary to achieve meaningful change, and therefore,
significant reform might not be politically feasible at this time. When asked
whether they are willing to pay more money out-of-pocket for their own medical
care in order to allow for universal coverage, only about half of respondents to a
large survey answered in the affirmative. 38 3 According to one commentator,
[tihe considerable inertia of the American political system, the generous
campaign contributions available from health insurers, and the antigovernment
ideological bent of the American people and their elected politicians present a
phalanx too powerful to be overcome by mere empirical evidence and reason
[concerning the desirability of a public system of health care financing].&l
Others, however, warn that with rising unemployment, as well as rapidly
increasing medical and health insurance premium costs, the United States is about
381. Allen Buchanan, Managed Care: Rationing Without Justice, But Not Unjustly, 23 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 617, 633 (1998).
382. See sources listed supra note 17.
383. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, supra note 17.
384. Jost, supra note 327, at 491-92. See also Zoloth, supra note 10, at 36 ("[I]t will be a
hard task politically. The forces that coalesced in 1992 were defeated very soundly.").
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to. face a serious health care crisis. 385 It is time to revive the debate concerning
health care reform. This Article has made an effort to analyze some of its most
controversial aspects and to generate questions for further thought. Without
significant reform, American society will continue to absorb the high social and
financial costs of the uninsured and underinsured, and the goal of moral fairness in
health coverage will remain unattainable.
385. Cohn, supra note 178, at 19-22; Emanuel, supra note 379, at 32. See also Robert
Pear, Propelled by Drug and Hospital Costs, Health Spending Surged in 2000, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2002, at A14 (reporting that "[national health spending shot up 6.9 percent to $1.3
trillion in 2000."); Drew E. Altman & Larry Levitt, The Sad History of Health Care Cost
Containment as Told in One Chart, HEALTH AFF. (Jan. 23, 2002), at
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/AltmanWebExclO12302.htm. The authors
state that "[t]he problem of rising health care costs is reemerging as a national issue." They
note that during the past thirty-five years, none of the efforts undertaken to control health
care costs in this country has had lasting success. While managed care and the "threat of the
Clinton health care reform plan" significantly slowed the rate of increase in private spending
in the mid-1990s, spending rose again in the late 1990s and reached double digit levels of
increase by 2001.
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